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 Modernization theory posits that economic growth and democratization are 
mutually constitutive processes. I extend a recent literature that finds this relationship to 
be spurious due to the existence of a number of international factors, specifically the role 
of foreign capital. Through two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions for as wide a 
sample as the data allow and two case studies (Indonesia and the Philippines), I find that 
the presence of US capital significantly influences domestic political institutions. This 
relationship, however, is non-linear and interrelated with exogenous shocks.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Studies of the causes of democracy are wide ranging in their theoretical impetus, 
methodologies, and conclusions. Despite being the basis for a wide body of research, 
very little consensus exists about what factors lead to democratic outcomes. The idea that 
economic prosperity and democratic institutions are tied together over time, sometimes 
referred to as modernization theory, has perhaps the greatest pedigree in the literature and 
in foreign policy circles.1 But contending perspectives argue that this perceived 
relationship is far too simplistic and overshadowed by greater influences. These views 
have received just as much support, and from a wider range of scholarly sources.2 One of 
the more important recent challenges to modernization theory has come from those 
arguing that democracy is diffused through international channels. This literature finds 
that the prevalence of democratic institutions in a country’s region and the exposure of a 
country to transnational networks positively affect the country’s level of democracy or 
probability of democratizing.3 The works in this field, however, typically under-specify 
the mechanisms driving this relationship. In this paper I look closely at one of the 
                                                           
1
 Perhaps most famously put forward in Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, 
no. 1 (1959). 
2
 Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment (Boston: New England Free Press, 
1966); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 
2, no. 3 (1970); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philipe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993); Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being 
in the World, 1950-1990 (2000); Daron Acemoglu et al., "Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis," 
Journal of Monetary Economics 56, no. 8 (2009). 
3
 This is typically defined in a functional sense. Democratization is the introduction of representative 
government in lieu of autocratic government. Empirical definitions of democracy vary, but typically 
emphasize formal constraints on the executive, free and fair elections, and civil liberties. 
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standard diffusion variables, the presence of foreign capital, and explore the venues 
through which it may affect domestic institutions. Specifically, I use an instrumental 
variable approach to measure whether foreign direct investment (FDI) from the US has 
an effect on political development that is distinct from general openness to foreign 
investment and economic growth. I also follow two autocratic regimes over their lifespan 
to parse out the influence of US-capital. Ultimately, this investigation suggests a 
significant, positive relationship between US-capital and levels of democracy, but this 
relationship is complex and highly contingent. 
 FDI is defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)4 as a lasting management interest in a foreign venture consisting of at least a 10 
percent share. This is in contrast to portfolio investment, which is typically short-term, 
consists of purchases of stocks and bonds in a country, and can be purely speculative in 
                                                           
4
 Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, "Oecd.Statextracts: Fdi Positions by 
Partner Country," ESDS International, (Mimas) University of Manchester, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx. 
Figure 1: GDP and FDI Stocks 
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nature. Increases in FDI stocks have been outpacing growth in incomes, as seen in Figure 
1. Since 1980 FDI stocks have quintupled from about 6 to 30 as a percent of world GDP.  
This is significant in its own right, but also suggests that the political impact I find for 
FDI in this analysis can be expected to grow as FDI becomes an ever more prominent 
component of economic growth and development. Notably, while the growth rate of FDI 
stocks in developing countries have been large, the rate growth of FDI stocks in 
developed countries has been larger, as seen in Figure 2. This does not undermine the 
main result of this paper, that US-FDI has a particular affect on political outcomes, 
however, as growth in FDI stocks is not a zero-sum game between countries; the effects 
found in this research are not merely aberrations constructed by North-North investment 
patterns for which high investment is closely correlated with high levels of democracy. 
But this pattern suggests the potential of reverse causality. That is, because most highly 
developed countries of the world are democracies and economically-minded rulers in 
non-democracies may believe that democratizing is necessary in order to obtain higher 
Figure 2: “North/South” FDI-Stocks 
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levels of direct investment, given that developed democracies get the lion’s share of FDI. 
Therefore, with the proper political institutions, leaders of developing economies may 
think that FDI will come rolling in; here the type of political institutions causes the level 
of FDI.  
 This thesis, however, is looking specifically at the effect of foreign investment on 
domestic political institutions. A number of explanations could account for an influence 
of FDI beyond its impact on levels of growth and growth’s subsequent effect on 
democracy, as modernization theorists propose. In particular, multinational corporations 
(MNCs), who are the primary suppliers of FDI, are likely to be partial to the political 
institutions of their home country, whether they are based in democracies or not. Thus 
MNCs may condition lasting investment in a host country on political reforms that move 
the country toward the MNCs political preferences. MNCs could also pressure local 
governments towards reforms once they attain a significant stake in a venture in the host 
country. Foreign employees or management that comes with the investment in physical 
capital also may introduce cultural traits and political leanings that are diffused through 
social interactions with locals, which I refer to as the “cultural diffusion” channel. And 
the MNCs may have dynamic economic incentives that are closely related to particular 
forms of institutions. I find evidence for some of these modes of transmission below, but 
this does not preclude the existence of others. 
It is important to point out that most countries with large MNCs have, historically, 
been high-income and politically democratic and most MNCs are therefore expected to 
have democratic leanings if the argument proposed here holds. But if the vast majority of 
MNCs are from these developed democracies it is then difficult to say whether MNC’s 
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political preferences are due to home-country institutions or inherent to the existence of 
MNCs wherever they exist. This concern is difficult to address because of the lack of data 
on MNCs coming from poorer non-democracies, but the following research addresses 
this issue in a few ways: first, on a theoretical level, there is no compelling reason to 
believe that MNCs will inherently prefer one type of political institution over another 
unless one type of political institution always provides a better investment environment. 
It is unclear that anything except secure property rights will be preferred in terms of 
political institutions. Second, the case studies in Section IV each find significant effects 
from the presence of US foreign capital on emerging democratic institutions. Conversely, 
Chinese businesses had a significant presence in both Indonesia and the Philippines over 
the period of study. In neither case did Chinese businesses pressure for more democratic 
institutions during the transitional periods. My findings thus suggest that historical 
happenstance may be driving the correlation between total FDI and the diffusion of 
democracy; FDI has, until recently with the rapid increases of Chinese and other 
developing world FDI, been dominated by MNCs from high-income democracies.  
The baseline argument for the following research is that political leaders that 
provide a stable and secure investment climate tend to be supported by MNCs, but once 
this payoff-certainty dissipates, the MNCs’ political preferences shift as well. If the 
political outcomes of the host country are not known, rents demanded by host-country 
elites and payoffs for the corporation are also murky. In such situations, I find that MNCs 
tend to support opposition groups that bear closest resemblance to the political leanings 
of their home-country regimes. This conclusion is based on the case studies of the 
Philippines and Indonesia, which are bolstered by time-series cross-sectional regressions 
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that utilize the broadest possible sample that the data allow. This is not to say that the 
“cultural diffusion” effect is found to be nonexistent, but rather that finding evidence for 
this more complex type of democratic diffusion requires a depth of evidence and on-the-
ground research beyond the scope of this project.  
 The primary findings of this paper are that FDI helps prop-up regimes,5 but as 
MNCs see the value of their investments evaporate due to political or social instability 
their support for political factions based on ideology rises. The rents garnered by regime 
elites through FDI strengthens their domestic position, but also binds their actions and 
places elites between the conflicting interests of foreign capital and domestic labor that 
supports opposition groups. These constraints tend to magnify the severity of exogenous 
economic and political crises. MNCs face increased discount rates in times of instability, 
which decreases the value of the regime in power and increases the value of political 
ideology amongst opposition candidates. Foreign investors will support the viable 
opposition groups that are closest to their own political ideology, which I argue tend to be 
closest to that of their home country. In particular, if US-capital has a significant presence 
during a transitional period it will have a democratizing effect on a country, but this 
effect is limited and does not extend to the consolidation of democracy post-transition.  
 The paper proceeds as follows: Chapter II is a brief review of the diffusion and 
FDI literature that provides context for my research. Chapter III describes the quantitative 
data, regression analysis, and discusses the conclusions. Chapter IV includes the case 
                                                           
5
 Significant evidence for the stabilizing effect of exposure to international economic networks, in 
general, has also been found by Ersin Özsahin, "The International Constraints on Regime Changes: How 
Globalization Hinders the Prospects for Democratization" (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010). 
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studies of the Philippines and Indonesia. Finally, I offer some concluding thoughts in 
Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Research on the diffusion of democracy has found that spatial proximity to other 
democracies or democratizing nations and the socioeconomic networks to which a 
country belongs are good predictors of whether or not a country will democratize. Not 
only is this relationship found to be strong, but it detracts from the otherwise significant 
relationship between domestic factors like education and levels of GDP that are found in 
the democratization literature.6 A cursory look at the third wave of democratization7 of 
the post-war era, however, suggests that the clumping of democracy in both space and 
time is a somewhat intuitive, if under-explained, pattern. Studies in the diffusion vein 
have tended to fall short of fleshing out the mechanisms driving diffusion, however, and 
have instead jumpstarted the field by arguing that a pattern does indeed exist that 
conflicts with standard modernization accounts. Two main lines of research are relevant 
for unpacking and theorizing about an FDI-diffusion variable: 1. the general diffusion 
literature and 2. modernization studies that include foreign capital as a correlate of 
economic growth. 
                                                           
6
 Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, "Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis," 
British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 01 (2003); Rafael Reuveny and Quan Li, "Economic Openness, 
Democracy, and Income Inequality," Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 5 (2003); Barbara Wejnert, 
"Diffusion, Development, and Democracy, 1800-1999," American Sociological Review 70, no. 1 (2005); 
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of 
Democratization," International Organization 60, no. 04 (2006); Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, 
"Diffusion Is No Illusion," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (2006).  
7
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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Previous scholarly attention given to FDI, has primarily focused on the effects of 
FDI on domestic incomes and economic structures8 and the determinants of FDI.9 The 
relationship between FDI and national income is generally found to be highly conditional 
or even ambiguous. Borensztein et al. (1998), for instance, find that FDI effects growth 
by both increasing investment and through technology transfers. But most of these 
positive externalities are found to be mitigated when FDI “crowds out” domestic 
investment. The same authors therefore argue that the host country must have adequate 
human capital, presumably through higher levels of education, to absorb new 
technologies and, in turn, realize the positive effects of FDI. De Soysa and O’Neal (1999) 
respond, however, that FDI benefits a host country via technology transfers and through 
more efficient modes of production that only come with foreign investment. The work on 
the determinants of FDI is slightly more homogenous. This literature tends to agree that 
political stability, macroeconomic health, and export orientation all positively increase 
levels of FDI.  
                                                           
8
 Eduardo Borensztein, Jose De Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee, "How Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Affect Economic Growth?," Journal of International Economics 45, no. 1 (1998); Luiz R. de Mello, 
"Foreign Direct Investment-Led Growth: Evidence from Time Series and Panel Data," Oxford Economic 
Papers 51, no. 1 (1999); James R. Markusen and Anthony J. Venables, "Foreign Direct Investment as a 
Catalyst for Industrial Development," European Economic Review 43, no. 2 (1999); Indra  de Soysa and 
John R. Oneal, "Boon or Bane? Reassessing the Productivity of Foreign Direct Investment," American 
Sociological Review 64, no. 5 (1999); Xiaoying Li and Xiaming Liu, "Foreign Direct Investment and 
Economic Growth: An Increasingly Endogenous Relationship," World Development 33, no. 3 (2005). 
9
 Robert E. B. Lucas, "On the Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment: Evidence from East and 
Southeast Asia," World Development 21, no. 3 (1993); Harinder Singh and W. Jun Kwang, "Some New 
Evidence on Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries," (1995); Alan Bevan and 
Saul Estrin, "The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies," (C.E.P.R. 
Discussion Papers, 2000); Nathan Michael Jensen, Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A 
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Matthias 
Busse and Carsten Hefeker, "Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment," European Journal 
of Political Economy 23, no. 2 (2007); Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Maylis Coupet, and Thierry Mayer, 
"Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment," World Economy 30, no. 5 (2007). 
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 Purely economic perspectives of FDI are potentially important to the question of 
FDI’s effect on democracy since, according to adherents of modernization theory, 
domestic incomes are a prominent determinant of democracy; FDI may affect economic 
growth, and levels of economic growth may in turn lead to changes in levels of 
democracy. It is useful to make a first cut into arguments about the effect of FDI on 
institutions along the modernization line of thinking given that a number of important 
perspectives revolve around the modernization hypothesis. First, dependency theorists 
have posited that FDI tends to impede long-term growth, increase economic inequality, 
and leads to authoritarian outcomes. Depressed growth and increasing inequality in turn 
undermine prospects for democracy.10 Conversely, those finding a primarily positive 
effect of FDI on growth posit that FDI tends to make democratization more likely 
through the faster economic growth it spurs.11 In other words, the net effect of FDI on 
political institutions hinges on FDI’s economic impact on a country, but this net effect 
remains a contentious debate and has trended to the conclusion that FDI’s effects are 
context and content specific. Those same discussions suggest that FDI’s political effects 
will also be context and content specific.  
A large number of often-contradictory theoretical contributions have been made 
about the effects of openness to foreign investment and other types of economic 
                                                           
10
 For instance, Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, "Cross-National 
Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of 
Findings and a Reanalysis," The American Journal of Sociology 84, no. 3 (1978). 
11
 Jensen, Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
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globalization on democratization.12 Whether FDI may influence host country institutions 
in a way other than through an impact on domestic economic factors, however, has not 
received as much attention. There are a number of reasons to believe that FDI could 
influence host country institutions beyond the standard modernization mechanisms. First, 
FDI is a lasting and large economic investment in the host country. This involves 
employing and maintaining a work force with adequate skills, maintaining fixed capital 
stocks through reinvestment and sustained property rights, and securing lasting access to 
natural resources and intermediate goods. Many different theoretical mechanisms could 
explain how these lasting economic investments might have an impact on political 
institutions, but I focus on a few specific modes of diffusion discussed below. 
The country of origin for FDI may play a part in how FDI affects host 
institutional development. Numerous authors have included a general FDI variable in 
regressions in an attempt to measure the holistic influence of international factors on 
institutions in the receiving country,13 but I have not found a country-specific FDI 
variable in quantitative works. This is most likely due to data limitations regarding 
country-specific FDI data. A country-specific argument is supported, however, by some 
authors who have found that being in the US “sphere of influence” makes a country more 
                                                           
12
 Summarized nicely by Li and Reuveny, "Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical 
Analysis." 
13
  Indra de Soysa, Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy, and Development: Assessing Contours, 
Correlates, and Concomitants of Globalization (London; New York: Routledge, 2003); Li and Reuveny, 
"Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis."; David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic 
Transitions," American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006); Özsahin, "The International 
Constraints on Regime Changes: How Globalization Hinders the Prospects for Democratization". 
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likely to democratize.14 Balaev uses country-specific trade variables to highlight the 
effect that trade with Russia had on satellite states’ levels of democracy.15 The author 
draws from world systems theory to argue that the countries within the Russian sphere of 
influence can be split into the hegemon (Russia), semi-periphery, and peripheral 
countries. Economic proximity to Russia is measured by three different 
operationalizations of the reach of trade with Russia and is a statistically significant and 
substantively large predictor of lower levels of democracy, robust to the inclusion of the 
standard control variables. Balaev measures trade exposure as a percentage of total trade, 
GDP, and population, respectively. I borrow from this operationalization to measure the 
influence of FDI coming specifically from the United States, the global hegemon over the 
period of study.  
In sum, international economic networks and the geographic proximity to other 
democratic countries in general have both been fairly well established as significant 
determinants of democracy in the literature. But why this pattern exists is less obvious, 
rigorously expounded, or agreed upon. There are strong reasons to believe that FDI will 
have significant and direct effects on levels of democracy, but the available literature 
suggests that these effects will be highly conditional in both magnitude and direction. 
Exploring this idea further, the following section establishes that US-FDI has a positive 
effect on levels of democracy that is separable from economic variables and diffusion 
variables alike.   
 
                                                           
14
 For example, Brinks and Coppedge, "Diffusion Is No Illusion." 
15
 Mikhail Balaev, "The Effects of International Trade on Democracy: A Panel Study of the Post-
Soviet World-System," Sociological Perspectives 52, no. 3 (2009). 
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CHAPTER III 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 Most of the major contributions to the diffusion literature use worldwide datasets 
that encompass as large of a sample over as long of a time period as possible. Typically, 
the sample ends up being strongly truncated in either the number of variables included or 
the time span covered. Most studies also only make a cursory mention of the within-
country effects that might complicate the story. The inherent assumption being that there 
is a generalizable trend across countries. Below I build on this research by including 
variables with a higher degree of country-specificity than is typically included in the 
diffusion literature. This necessarily comes at the cost of statistical power and time-span 
of the study. Nevertheless, the results suggest that there exists a direct, positive 
relationship between US-FDI and levels of democracy, although the relationship is 
conditional on the definition of democracy employed. This definitional ambiguity 
motivates the case studies that follow the quantitative portion of my research. 
The General Model 
  Untangling the causal relationships between two broad and intertwined variables 
like democracy and capital investments is a complex process. In particular, there is likely 
to be a problem of endogeneity between my explanatory and outcome variables. I expect 
this to bias estimates upwards in a standard OLS regression estimation. With US-FDI we 
would expect US-based firms to be more likely to invest in democracies, based on the 
theoretical considerations above, and the economic impact of FDI to also have an effect 
on regime type, as modernization theorists would argue. The two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach is a standard method of producing unbiased coefficient estimates in 
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situations with a potentially large endogeneity problem. 2SLS approaches control for 
endogeneity bias by utilizing an instrumental variable that is correlated with the 
“independent” variable, but is not a direct determinant of the “dependent” variable. If 
these assumptions hold, then the 2SLS approach removes the bias introduced by having a 
reciprocal relationship between the “independent” and “dependent” variables. The basic 
2SLS model for this study is as follows: 
1st	Stage:		
 =  +  +  +  +  
2nd	Stage:										 =  +  + 
 !  + " + # 
 In the above model  is the democracy outcome variable with  and $ being 
country and year indicators, respectively.  is the set of control variables discussed in 
more detail below. " and  are country fixed effects, which control for country-specific 
trends over time.  is the US-China exchange rate discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. # and  are stochastic elements. The main variable of interest is 
, which 
measures the extent of the influence of US-FDI. I use two operationalizations for this 
variable: US-FDI as a percentage of GDP and per capita US-FDI. Both types of 
measurements are borrowed from Balaev’s (2009) treatment of trade with Russia. Balaev 
also includes a third variable, which is bilateral Russian trade as a percentage of a 
country’s total trade. As described below, however, this variable poses a particular 
problem and is therefore not included in this study. While the %&	'()
*(+
 and %&	'()
+,-
 measures 
are each absolute in terms of measuring the relative influence of US-FDI, the %&	'()
.,/0	'()
 
variable can fluctuate based on changes in FDI coming from other nations or from 
changes in US-FDI. Therefore a similar change in magnitude in the %&	'()
.,/0	'()
	 variable for 
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two different countries could be explained by widely different circumstances. For 
example, the same observed change could be due to a mass influx of investment from US 
firms for one country and a large decrease of FDI from, say, China for a different 
country. Although in many cases this third element is an important measure of the 
relative importance of US firms to a country’s investment portfolio, it is highly 
problematic if one expects FDI from other countries to have a similar influence on 
domestic institutions to that of US-FDI. 
 Another noteworthy trait of the model is that the explanatory variables are all 
lagged one year. A contemporaneous relationship between the explanatory and dependent 
variables is difficult to theorize and to accurately measure as simultaneous changes are 
not particularly feasible in a causal sense and further compound endogeneity problems. 
The standard approach in the literature is to lag variables by one period. Also worth 
mentioning is the lack of a lagged dependent variable amongst the explanatory variables 
in this model. A few of the more significant works in modernization studies include a 
lagged dependent variable,16 the rationale being that institutional ‘stickiness’ can explain 
much of the variance, or lack thereof, in democracy indices. Importantly, however, many 
more works, particularly in the diffusion literature, do not include a lagged dependent 
variable.17 2SLS approaches are also not regularly used since it is prohibitively difficult 
                                                           
16
  Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions."; Daron Acemoglu et al., "Income and Democracy," 
American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (2008); Acemoglu et al., "Reevaluating the Modernization 
Hypothesis." 
17
 Li and Reuveny, "Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis."; Nita Rudra, 
"Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World," American Journal of 
Political Science 49, no. 4 (2005); Gleditsch and Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of 
Democratization."; Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, "Economic and Social Factors Driving 
the Third Wave of Democratization," Journal of Comparative Economics 36, no. 3 (2008). 
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to find an instrument that has a causal effect on either democracy or economic growth, 
but not on the other. Eichengreen and Leblang,18 notably, use 2SLS model and do not 
include a lagged dependent variable. Indeed, a lagged dependent variable should be 
included when more direct and conventional ways of controlling for endogeneity, such as 
2SLS, are not feasible for one reason or another. I argue that my inclusion of an 
instrumental variable preempts the need for a lagged dependent variable.  
FDI and Other Diffusion Variables 
 The statistical models and sets of variables employed in studying the diffusion of 
democracy vary widely. These always include some measure of the proportion of 
neighboring democracies and/or the global proportion of democracies. Other variables 
that vary depending on the focus of the authors include trade, trade partners, openness to 
investment, total FDI, portfolio investment, and membership in intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs). All such works also include modernization variables, including per 
capita GDP and growth, as well as other country-specific controls. The significance of 
coefficient estimates across these specifications vary quite a bit, except for the diffusion 
variables, but the specifications usually have a couple of problems at a theoretical level: 
namely that endogeneity between dependent and independent variables is not addressed 
and “kitchen sink” specifications neglect the potential multicollinearity between, say, 
trade and FDI. Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that US-FDI will have an effect 
on democracy that is distinct from these other diffusion mechanisms. 
                                                           
18
 Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang, "Democracy and Globalization," Economics and Politics 20, 
no. 3 (2008). 
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 Firstly, FDI stocks represent a more lasting interest in a country compared to the 
other economic variables that are often employed. Levels of trade might represent elite 
interactions to reach trade agreements and norms could be transmitted in this venue. But 
trade could also be a purely economic interaction where companies have a mutually 
beneficial incentive to decrease trade barriers due to a comparative advantage. Likewise, 
portfolio investment is more likely to be speculative, fickle, and less representative of 
direct interactions. But it is also expected that all of these variables will be closely 
correlated and therefore difficult to detach in statistical analysis without solid theoretical 
distinctions. In sum, the large and long-term characteristics of FDI make it more likely to 
have a direct political effect in host countries, whereas other international economic 
factors may only affect a country through their impact on economic growth. The 
inclusion of these other variables as controls, however, is complicated by the fact that 
they typically are closely correlated with FDI. 
 My regressions also include Coppedge’s diffusion variable, which is significant in 
all of the specifications, but the regressions do not include the proportion of democracies 
in the world or membership in IGOs, other variables sometimes included in the diffusion 
literature. These variables are more difficult to justify theoretically. Including the 
proportion of worldwide democracy as an independent variable is problematic since 
worldwide democracy, obviously, predicts worldwide democracy and therefore will be 
endogenous to any country level shift in level of democracy. Therefore, a significant 
coefficient estimate here could be due to a worldwide trend or merely a not-so-cleverly 
constructed variable.  
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Membership in IGOs may be a mechanism by which worldwide democracy is 
transferred to a particular country, but it is unclear which IGOs should display this effect 
and how to measure the “extent” of membership for each IGO. Furthermore, there is 
reason to believe that, depending on the IGO, the pressure for democracy may be 
negative or positive. Therefore including blanket IGO measures would be flawed. 
Likewise, truncating the IGOs included and focusing solely on major IGOs will 
undoubtedly lead to significant results. This result found in the literature could originate 
from a selection bias in which large democracies are the dominant members of IGOs and 
have a disposition towards selecting other democracies as new members. It could also be 
possible that countries usher in reforms in order to gain membership to IGOs, but this too 
is far from clear in the literature and is not a direct diffusion mechanism, per se.  
 Conversely, FDI is a lasting, country-specific, and internationally based factor. 
The relative lasting nature of FDI creates a shareholder status that leads to greater 
concern for social and political stability than other types of investment. Most of the other 
diffusion variables rely on loose logic and speculation about mechanisms between elites 
at the international level. These general diffusion mechanisms may exist, but finding 
statistically significant coefficients through particular, less than complete specifications is 
not a complete engagement with the issues at hand. Country-specific FDI is a much more 
viable mechanism when controlling for economic growth, regional diffusion, and any 
endogenous relationship than other diffusion variables. I discuss the method of 
controlling for endogeneity in the following section.  
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China-US Exchange Rate Instrument 
 Naïvely estimating the second stage without an instrumental variable would lead 
to biased estimates because of the correlation between the democracy, , and the error 
term, #. My exchange rate instrument effectively controls for this effect as long as the 
outcome variable is not also correlated with the error in the first-stage, ; the 
relationship between the exchange rate instrument, , and 
 is strong; and if there 
are theoretical grounds to believe that the relationship between  and 
 is causal 
and not a statistical aberration. Since we are looking specifically at the effect that US-FDI 
has on political institutions I need an instrument that is highly correlated with US-FDI but 
is not also directly linked to democratic outcomes in order to identify the causal effects in 
the 2SLS method. I have settled on US-China exchange rates. While there is some 
conflicting evidence on the topic, there have been strong findings that the appreciation of 
a currency increases capital investment outflows from that country.19 The logic behind an 
exchange rate instrument is that as the dollar becomes more valuable against world 
currencies, US investment abroad becomes more enticing for US-based MNCs. Likewise, 
as the value of the dollar goes down US investment is also expected to go down. Opting 
for the dollar-yuan exchange rate instead of another more comprehensive measurement of 
the strength of the dollar, however, may be problematic. 
 There is an argument to be made that instead of a China-specific exchange rate 
instrument one should instead use a more general exchange rate measure. Over the period 
in question (1985-96) China was just beginning to usher in the current era of high levels 
                                                           
19
 Kenneth Froot and Jeremy Stein, "Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An Imperfect 
Capital Markets Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 4 (1991); Bruce A. Blonigen, 
"Firm-Specific Assets and the Link between Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment," The 
American Economic Review 87, no. 3 (1997). 
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of FDI. There are a few practical and theoretical reasons to choose this instrument over 
another. First, I tested composite index of all major currencies against the dollar as well 
as the pound, yen, and yuan exchange rates (the euro did not exist over the extent of my 
study) as instruments for the US-FDI variables. Dollar-yuan exchange rates yield the 
strongest correlations and the most significant 1-statistics (see table 3 below). The high 
1-stats suggest that this is a strong and valid instrument for the two FDI variables of 
interest, but this significance did not exist for the other potential instruments.  
Second, the China/US exchange rate is a statistically significant predictor of the 
US-FDI variable over the period in question. As seen in Figure 1, as the dollar 
appreciated against the yuan overall US-FDI also increased. Importantly, however, over 
this period the disparity between US and Chinese FDI decreased by numerous 
magnitudes. This suggests that over this period Chinese FDI began to compete against 
US-FDI even if in aggregate it remained significantly lower. As it begins to become a 
Figure 3: Exchange Rate Instrument and Other Key Indicators 
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global competitor for investment, the relative strength of the yuan against the dollar can 
determine which country is better able to invest at the margins. The coefficient estimates 
for the instrument in the first-stage regressions are also statistically significant. This is not 
to say that this exchange rate is the cause of increases in US-FDI, but it is certainly a 
factor or a proxy for other factors.  
 Finally, the importance of the yuan/dollar measure against the competing 
exchange rates variables is not that it is strong currency, but that it is one coming from a 
developing country, emerging economy, and non-democracy. This is important because 
the effect we are aiming to control for with this instrument is US-FDI that is going to 
other countries because the other country is an established democracy. When US-FDI has 
a democratizing effect this will be in countries with some similar characteristics to China, 
not in countries such as Japan or Britain. In conclusion, this instrument may not be 
perfect in determining US-FDI shares in the sample, but the evidence suggests that it is at 
least a good proxy for latent variables driving the increases of US-FDI to developing 
countries beyond time trends alone.  
Description of Data 
 The data originates from a number of different sources. Summary statistics are 
provided in table 1. I use the four major indices for democracy found in the literature: 
Polity IV,20 Vanhanen,21 PACL,22 each of which was gathered from the relevant scholar’s 
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 Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, "Polity Iv Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2002,"  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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 Tatu Vanhanen, "A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998," Journal of Peace Research 
37, no. 2 (2000). 
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 José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, "Democracy and 
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website, and the trichotomous Epstein et al.23 variable, which is constructed from Polity 
IV.24 The yearly China-US exchange rate variable and the other exchange rates are 
gathered from the St. Louis FRED database.25 US troop deployment levels come from 
The Heritage Foundation.26 PPP-GDP, growth, and population data are from the Penn 
World Table.27 The diffusion variable is Brinks and Coppedge’s (2006) measure, 
available from Michael Coppedge’s website.28 This is a normalized measure of a 
country’s level of democracy against that of its neighbors; a negative score indicates the 
country has a lower democracy score than the average of its neighbors. And finally the 
FDI variables are found on the OECD online database.29  
 The GDP and growth rate variables control for income levels and are highly 
correlated with levels of education, two standard variables in the modernization literature. 
The diffusion variable controls for the standard set of diffusion arguments about 
proximity to democratic countries. Previous works30 have also found urbanization to be a 
significant predictor of democratic outcomes and a check on the modernization 
mechanisms. The US military variable is included as a check on other forms of a US 
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 Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions." 
24
 Authoritarian is -10-0, mixed is 0-7, and full democracy is 7-10 on the Polity scale.  
25
 "China / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate," FRED database (St. Louis Federal Reserve, 2010). 
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 Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003 (Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 
Center for Data Anaylsis, 2004). 
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30
 Acemoglu et al., "Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis." 
  
23 
 
presence that could explain why a country democratizes. For instance, there may have 
been a significant increase in US capital inflows into Iraq following the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, but the implementation of democracy was due to political and military actions in 
the country, for which US troop levels are an adequate proxy in most such cases.  
The Polity variable is a twenty-one point range, with -10 being complete 
authoritarianism and 10 being complete democracy. It is comprised of a variety of 
measures such as executive constraint, political competition, and executive recruitment 
processes. Polity is by far the most used of the indices, but I also include other democracy 
indices as points of comparison. The Vanhanen index is a composite score of 
participation among voters and competition amongst candidates in percent points. The 
PACL binary variable is particularly stringent in its definition of democracy.31  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Polity  1.781 7.182 -10 10 
Vanhanen 12.263 13.147 0 47.08 
PACL 0.477 0.5 0 1 
Epstein, et al. 0.948 0.874 0 2 
Log FDI 7.573 2.68 0.039 15.096 
Log US-FDI 6.508 3.013 0 13.064 
US-FDI/population 67.981 214.154 0.003 2864.579 
US-FDI/GDP 63.515 131.97 0.013 1265.806 
Diffusion -0.428 3.252 -10 10 
Urbanization 51.239 23.577 4.84 100 
Log US military 3.596 2.334 0 11.918 
Growth rate 1.919 7.607 -64.36 118.243 
Log GDP 8.323 1.163 4.777 11.559 
China-US ex 6.476 2.178 1.981 8.64 
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 The conditions of which are that 
 (1) The chief executive is elected; 
 (2) The legislature is elected; 
 (3) More than one political party exists; 
 (4) There has been at least one transfer of power.  
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 The data is unbalanced and constrained to an unrepresentative set of countries. 
The chief variable of interest, FDI, is the primary cause of the data shortcomings so there 
is no obvious way to get around this issue. The OECD did not begin collecting FDI data 
of any kind until 1975 and country-specific FDI data dates to 1985. Reporting of FDI 
variables is also relatively spotty. For example, there are no data available for former 
Soviet satellite states before 1991. The important democratic diffusion variable constrains 
the data set at the top-end with no data available beyond 1996. The data is limited to an 
11 year period, 1985-96, and there are a number of missing data points. The number of 
usable data points we are left with is slightly above 600 and a sample that covers 102 
countries with the maximum number of data points (11) only being available for 29 of 
these countries.32 While the data is clearly not ideal or complete, a significant number of 
data points do exist. Below I discuss alternative techniques that are less data-intensive 
that could be used to address this problem.    
 Table 2 provides a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. The closest 
correlation amongst the explanatory variables is between logged GDP and urbanization at 
0.789. None of the variables are close enough to warrant worrying about multicollinearity 
problems. Also of note is the strong correlation between logged US-FDI and logged total 
FDI (see column 1) and the much lower correlation between the %&	'()
-,-
 and %&	'()
*(+
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 For the baseline Polity IV variable the following 102 countries are included in the analysis: Algeria, 
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variables and total FDI. This suggests that while total FDI and US-FDI are closely 
related, the proportional effects of  %&	'()
-,-
 and %&	'()
*(+
 cannot be explained by diffusion 
arguments about total FDI.  
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1 Log FDI 1 
2 Log US-FDI 0.855 1 
3 US-FDI/pop 0.375 0.41 1 
4 US-FDI/GDP 0.538 0.577 0.457 1 
5 Diffusion -0.174 -0.1 0.059 0.148 1 
6 Urbanization 0.546 0.587 0.276 0.287 -0.108 1 
7 Log US mil 0.408 0.491 0.105 0.323 -0.129 0.394 1 
8 Growth rate 0.136 0.087 0.043 0.006 -0.122 0.033 0.024 1 
9 Log GDP 0.68 0.663 0.396 0.275 -0.212 0.789 0.435 0.128 1 
10 China-US ex. 0.283 -0.061 0.073 0.037 -0.005 0.131 -0.066 0.126 0.214 1 
 
Regression Results 
 Table 3 contains the first-stage estimates as well as the second stage results of my 
2SLS regression. Each specification here includes country-level fixed-effects. These 
control for country-specific time trends or other idiosyncrasies that might otherwise bias 
the coefficient estimates. I report estimates for both the Polity and Vanhanen indices. For 
the first-stage regressions in columns (1) and (2), the US/China exchange rate variable is 
a highly significant predictor of the FDI variables and 1-statistics are each well above 10 
indicating a good and valid instrumental variable.33  
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 Stock, James H., Johnathan H. Wright, and Motohiro Yogo. "A Survey of Weak Instruments and 
Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20, 
no. 4 (2002): 518-29. 
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 The main regression results for the continuous democracy – Polity and Vanhanen 
– indices are in columns (3)-(6) of table 3. There is clearly a divergence between indices 
for both of the US-FDI variables. In both regressions, levels of urbanization and 
democratic diffusion are significant predictors of the level of democracy. Note that the 
negative coefficient values on the diffusion variable indicate that higher democracy 
scores amongst neighboring countries is positively associated with higher own level of 
democracy as this measure is essentially a deficit in the democracy index. Interestingly, 
the US-FDI/GDP variable is significant for the Polity index, but the per capita US-FDI 
variable is not. Both variables are significant for the Vanhanen dependent variable. Direct 
interpretation of these estimates are difficult with the Polity index and with the inclusion 
of the instrumental variables, but it is possible to back out an example of the magnitude 
of these coefficients with the Vanhanen index, which is a composite measure of vote-
shares and voter turnout. For column (3), taking as an example Indonesia in 1996 and 
holding GDP and vote-shares constant, the regression estimates suggest that a one 
percentage point increase in US-FDI (US $15 million) would result in about 975,415 
more voters in 1997; $15.38 in US-FDI in 1996 would lead to one more Indonesian voter 
in 1997, independent of the effect that Indonesian politics has on enticing US-FDI. This 
result should, obviously, be taken with a grain of salt, but remains highly suggestive as 
this investment is not in the form of political donations nor is directly political in any 
sense. By comparison, direct funding of get-out-the-vote efforts in the US are estimated 
to cost between $5 and $15 per person.34 
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Table 3: First Stage and Continuous Variable Results. 
 First Stage   Second Stage 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables US-FDI/ 
GDP lag 
US-FDI/ 
pop lag 
  Polity IV Vanhanen 
         
China/US exch 5.4275*** 4.3319***       
 (0.839) (0.784)       
US-FDI/gdp lag     0.025*  0.076**  
     (0.015)  (0.031)  
US-FDI/pop lag      0.031  0.095** 
      (0.019)  (0.043) 
Logged GDP lag 1.1105 45.0047***   1.355* -0.031 -1.146 -5.328 
 (8.514) (7.946)   (0.822) (1.498) (1.750) (3.307) 
Growth rate lag -0.4036* -0.3371   -0.033 -0.033 -0.127** -0.126** 
 (0.239) (0.223)   (0.024) (0.025) (0.050) (0.055) 
Diffusion lag 0.0283 -0.4532   -0.549*** -0.534*** -0.991*** -0.946*** 
 (0.684) (0.639)   (0.066) (0.068) (0.139) (0.151) 
Urbanization lag 0.7700 -2.3107***   0.181** 0.273*** 0.566*** 0.843*** 
 (0.884) (0.825)   (0.089) (0.085) (0.189) (0.188) 
Log US military lag -1.2099 2.5466   0.336** 0.225 -0.291 -0.624 
 (1.702) (1.589)   (0.165) (0.175) (0.351) (0.387) 
         
Observations 622 622   610 610 612 612 
# of Countries 103 103   92 92 93 93 
F-stat 20.10 28.80       
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clustering standard errors by country is a technically superior methodology in this 
situation35 and leads to quite similar results that can be found in table 4. Notably, 
however, neither of the FDI variables nor the urbanization variable is significant for the 
Polity index here. The US-FDI variables remain significant for the Vanhanen 
specifications as well as the urbanization variable. The diffusion variable remains 
significant for all specifications of Polity and Vanhanen indices. 
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 Petersen, Mitchell A. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
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Table 4: Clustered Standard Errors by Country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Polity IV Vanhanen 
     
US-FDI/gdp lag 0.025  0.076*  
 (0.019)  (0.045)  
US-FDI/pop lag  0.031  0.095* 
  (0.024)  (0.051) 
Logged GDP lag 1.355 -0.031 -1.146 -5.328 
 (1.754) (2.610) (3.699) (5.196) 
Growth rate lag -0.033 -0.033 -0.127 -0.126 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.090) (0.091) 
Diffusion lag -0.549*** -0.534*** -0.991** -0.946** 
 (0.158) (0.168) (0.400) (0.435) 
Urbanization lag 0.181 0.273 0.566* 0.843* 
 (0.131) (0.185) (0.310) (0.478) 
Log US military lag 0.336* 0.225 -0.291 -0.624 
 (0.204) (0.246) (0.334) (0.546) 
     
Observations 610 610 612 612 
# of Countries 92 92 93 93 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 As a further point of comparison, I test the model with two other standard 
measures of democracy. The results are in table 5. Przeworski et al.36 make a strong 
argument against the convoluted and arguably biased Polity IV rankings, and against the 
received conclusions about the causal influence of economic development on levels of 
democracy. They create a binary democracy/autocracy set, as discussed above. Results 
for this binary variable are found in rows (1)-(4) of table 5.  Rows (3) and (4) present 
country-level clustered standard errors.37 Epstein et al. reply to Przeworski et al. that the 
                                                           
36
 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 
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 Using the Przeworski et al. data set results in more data points for more countries being available. 
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binary conception of democracy is too stringent and biases results by clumping all partial 
democracies into the autocracy category.38 Epstein et al. find that most of the movement 
in regime type is to or from a middle, mixed-democracy category, but they agree with 
Przeworski et al. that treating Polity as continuous is problematic. Thus they group Polity 
into three sections: autocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy. The results for the 
Epstein et al. dependent variable, again with country-level clustered standard errors, are 
in rows (3) and (4). There is reason to believe, however, that introducing fixed effects 
into an ordered probit estimation like this yields inconsistent or nonsensical results.39 Due 
to the probably unreliable nature of fixed-effect estimates, I drop the fixed-effects for the 
Epstein et al. variable in columns (6) and (7) of Table 5.  
 As would be expected since it is derived from the Polity index, the FDI variables 
with the Epstein et al. dependent variable are insignificant. We would expect these 
coefficients to become more significant if the inclusion of fixed effects was possible with 
ordered probit specifications, but this is unavailable. Nevertheless, these results bolster 
the insignificant coefficients found for the continuous Polity variable. The Przeworski et 
al. specifications all have significant coefficient estimates, except in column (4) which 
includes country-level clustered standard errors with the US-FDI/population variable. 
These estimates almost meet the standard 10% level of significance. The added 
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progressing towards a manageable estimator in such models, much less when there is an instrumental 
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explanatory power of the lagged income variable for the Przeworski et al. dependent 
variable is also noteworthy. 
Table 5: Binary and Trichotomous Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Przeworski et al. Epstein et al. 
       
US-FDI/gdp lag 0.035***  0.035*  0.009  
 (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.008)  
US-FDI/pop lag  0.034***  0.034$  0.006 
  (0.007)  (0.021)  (0.010) 
Logged GDP lag 2.969*** 2.015*** 2.969* 2.015$ 0.705** 0.525 
 (0.530) (0.551) (1.770) (1.263) (0.279) (0.529) 
Growth rate lag -0.033 -0.034* -0.033 -0.034$ -0.032* -0.033* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
Diffusion lag -0.507*** -0.502*** -0.507*** -0.502*** -0.168*** -0.136*** 
 (0.070) (0.067) (0.122) (0.130) (0.055) (0.047) 
Urbanization lag -0.020 0.068*** -0.020 0.068 -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.068) (0.068) (0.008) (0.010) 
Log US military lag -0.042 0.114 -0.042 0.114 -0.042 0.045 
 (0.221) (0.119) (0.235) (0.228) (0.121) (0.060) 
       
Observations 1247 1247 1247 1247 636 636 
# of Countries 130 130 130 130 106 106 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, $<0.12 
 
 
Potential Biases   
 A number of factors beyond the endogeneity problems discussed above could bias 
the estimates. First, more wealthy countries have better and more accurate data reporting, 
hence are disproportionately represented amongst the countries with the most complete 
FDI data for 1985-1996. One solution besides waiting for better data to become available 
is bootstrapping the data, so that underrepresented data becomes artificially better 
represented in the sample. But over the sample period we would expect wealthier 
countries to have both higher levels of investment and less movement in the democracy 
indices. Therefore the coefficient estimates here would be expected to be biased 
downwards, and thus can be considered lower-bounds. As FDI reporting becomes more 
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standardized and extends over a longer period this may be worth revisiting in future 
research.  
 Another important shortcoming of my quantitative analysis is the limited time 
range. The magnitude of FDI in the global economy has skyrocketed since the beginning 
of the OECD dataset in 1975. But my analysis is missing data from 1996-present due to 
the lack of the important (and significant across all of the specifications) diffusion 
variable. Given fewer time constraints, it would be straightforward to reconstruct 
Coppedge’s diffusion variable for the years after 1996. As is, I must rely on the 1985-
1996 sample as country-specific FDI data begins in 1985. This could underestimate the 
effects of FDI on democracy as there may be nonlinearities in the relationship between 
FDI and democracy. For instance, a threshold level of FDI may exist, relative to country 
or relative to corporation, where foreign capital becomes profoundly more influential 
and/or interested in domestic political outcomes. Or FDI may influence partial-
democracies in a way that it does not affect autocracies because of the existence of, say, 
electoral politics. With this in mind, however, this 11-year analysis is meant more as a 
window into the relationship rather than definitive evidence of a specific relationship.  
 My argument also rests on the assumption that MNCs become more interested in 
political ideology in host countries when regimes are strained by exogenous crises and 
outcomes are uncertain. Major exogenous economic and political shocks are of particular 
importance and largely absent in the available data. For instance, I hypothesize that 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis countries with a strong US firm presence that 
were severely hit by the crisis would be more likely to undergo democratization and more 
likely to have remained stable prior to the crisis. If data were available after the crisis 
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then this would warrant a Markov switching model that would find drastically different 
effects before and after the event. My case study on Indonesia goes some way in 
explaining the role the crisis played in the interaction between these variables there, but a 
more complete and longer data set would be needed to adequately measure this 
relationship quantitatively.  
As a point of comparison, I ran the regressions over the whole sample omitting 
the diffusion variable.40 Dropping this variable increased the sample size and the 
coverage period. The US-FDI variables also became more influential, but it is difficult to 
say how much of this came directly from the omitted diffusion variable and what 
explanatory power can be attributed to changes in US-FDI over the period. It is possible 
to restrict the sample to the one left by the diffusion variable and decompose the increase 
in the US-FDI variable due to dropping the diffusion variable. This approach, however, 
could not account for changes over time between these key variables. That is, it could 
explain how collinear diffusion and US-FDI were from 1985-1996, but the relationship 
between these variables may be altered in the years after 1996 or consistently change 
over time. If this is the case, then we could not accurately readjust the US-FDI 
coefficients downwards in post-estimation. The changes in patterns of FDI from 1997-
2011 have been significant and so have the geopolitical interactions between countries. 
Therefore it is difficult to say what contributes to this increased significance of the US-
FDI variables when dropping the diffusion variable. As I discuss below, the diffusion 
variable is one of the most consistently significant of the explanatory variables.  
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Discussion  
 Results for my FDI variables with Polity, the democracy index considered to be 
the most reliable41 and the most used, are insignificant. But it is difficult to tell what this 
indicates. To shed more light on these results I repeat the estimation with three alternative 
indices of democracy. Two of these three, Vanhanen and Pzreworski et al, yield 
significant coefficient estimates. Different control variables, specifically levels of 
incomes and urbanization, also vary in significance across measures. Importantly, 
democratic diffusion remains significant across all specifications.  
 These results indicate some interesting findings. First, they corroborate previous 
works that have found that democratic diffusion actually does happen and that it 
undermines the typically strong relationship between income levels or economic growth 
and democracy. Second, if causal claims are going to be made regarding the determinants 
of democracy in a general sense then better measures of democracy are required. With a 
lack of consensus on the definition of democracy amongst social scientists we cannot 
make anything but highly qualified claims about the determinants of democracy. For 
instance, it is difficult to say that US-FDI puts informal constraints on the executive 
because the Polity index only includes a quantification of formal constraints on the 
executive. The case studies below, however, find that US-FDI has resulted in greater 
informal constraint on executives. Furthermore, the Vanhanen and Przeworski et al. 
specifications suggest that US-FDI tends to increase participation and competition in 
political elections, but considering that each index is a composite of multiple elements of 
“democracy,” it is difficult to say which parts are moving due to US-FDI. The suggestion 
                                                           
41
 Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating 
Alternative Indices," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (2002). 
  
34 
 
that participation and competition in elections increase due to US-FDI is corroborated in 
the case studies below, but these regressions do not suggest a particular mode for this 
effect. These mechanisms will be developed in the case studies. 
 A few issues are outstanding from my estimations. Country-level effects are not 
included here. These include race, ethnic, and religious fractionalization; levels of 
education; and the type of democratic institutions that are developed. Country fixed-
effects control for the explanatory power of such factors, but do not shed light on which 
are significant or how they may interact with cross-country investment. Demographic 
homogeneity may affect countries in a number of different ways. It may lead to less 
rancor amongst minority groups and less demand for, say, proportional representation. 
Homogeneity may also make a country more stable and effectual, regardless of political 
institutions. Levels of education could lead to pressure for democracy as individuals 
come to recognize democracy as an ideal political institution through learning or demand 
greater civil liberties to go with their wealth.42 Some have also argued that the durability 
of democratic regimes is partially a function of presidentialism versus parliamentarism.43  
While strong cases have been made for all of these mechanisms, the fixed effects 
in the regression above will control for any explanatory power of static, country-level 
variables such as these. And, over the period of study, there is little to no variation across 
countries for most of these variables. The one potential problem would be if one of these 
omitted variables was a root cause of the instrumental variable and democracy. But there 
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is no intuitive reason why any of these demographic variables would be related to 
US/China exchange rates.  
 Democratic diffusion clearly happens across countries, but the statistical results 
above suggest that there are also cross-country effects through foreign investment in 
capital that augment diffusion. My results thus far suggest that these cross-country effects 
are ambiguous in level of significance and depend on far from perfect democracy indices. 
Nevertheless, the positive effect of US-FDI is independent of the general diffusion trend, 
economic growth, and the effect that FDI may have through economic growth. To get a 
better sense of how the presence of US-FDI may affect domestic politics I now turn to 
two case studies, the Philippines and Indonesia. Both countries made transitions towards 
more democratic institutions after significant stints under autocratic rule and shared 
regional trends and pressures during each of their respective transitions. Many of the 
influences of each transition were different, however, including the type of pressure from 
US capital. But despite the pressures being different in form, US capital constrained 
autocrats and supported fledgling democracy in each case. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDIES 
 The relationship between FDI and political development is complex and can only 
be roughly approximated by linear estimation. The cross-country statistical analysis 
detailed in the prior section reveals a positive relationship between US-based FDI and 
levels of democracy, with the significance dependent on the democracy metric employed. 
But the linear relationship this analysis finds is only a simple, direct relationship. Actors 
with vested economic interests may influence and constrain domestic elites in ways not 
picked up in regression analysis and these effects may vary over a longer time period 
than current data allows. If a country is politically stable and predictable, the constraints 
from foreign capital will be a standard set of political economy interests and pressures: 
corporations will compete to maximize their own profits and rents from the host country. 
However, once a transitional period has commenced the influence of FDI is conditioned 
by domestic political factors, the political ideology of the corporation with fixed 
investments, and the coalition(s) that the corporation joins and/or supports. Quantitative 
indices of democracy and political fractionalization do not include a level of nuance that 
can adequately measure these influences and so this project will now turn to two case 
studies in order to highlight a few ways that FDI can influence political transitions. By 
looking at countries that share regional trends, but vary in political and economic 
pressures, I argue that FDI generally constrains elites in times of stability. In times of 
instability, however, US-based FDI and portfolio investment tends to pressure countries 
towards more democratic institutions. I focus on the Philippines and Indonesia as 
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countries that share regional trends , but have varied patterns of economic and political 
development.   
The Philippines 
 The Philippines has experienced direct and strong political pressure from the US 
through virtually every channel possible since the country gained independence at the end 
of World War II. The chief benefactors of the US presence were the Marcoses, the ruling 
family from 1965 to 1986, and other elites close to the Marcoses. US political and 
economic actors played pivotal roles in installing Ferdinand Marcos as leader, 
suppressing opposition forces, and entrenching ruling elites with vast economic resources 
through kickbacks, graft, and direct aid. When Marcos began to lose control of the 
country, the Reagan Administration dawdled. US actors with an interest in the 
Philippines diverged in their long-standing support of Marcos, splitting along party lines 
in the US, with most Republicans standing by Marcos and most Democrats backing the 
opposition leader, Corazon Aquino. US business interests in the Philippines, which 
tended to be formally aligned with the Republican Party, pressured for more democratic 
procedures in the elections and clearly favored the opposition candidate Aquino both at 
home and in the Philippines. While democratization in the Philippines was primarily 
driven by domestic level politics, foreign actors played a significant and possibly pivotal 
role before and during the transition. 
To further explore this idea, the following section will proceed by first outlining 
the various channels of political influence and pressure from the US, detailing the 
domestic situation around the time of Aquino’s ascendance, and then describing the 
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unique role US capital played in influencing the political transition relative to other 
influences from the US.   
US Military 
 The US gained colonial rule over the Philippines following the Spanish-American 
war’s end in 1898. This was followed shortly thereafter by a Filipino uprising against 
American authority, which was quashed a few years later in 1902. Legislation in the US 
slowly progressed towards Filipino independence until WWII and the subsequent 
Japanese occupation. Following WWII, independence was granted to the Philippines by 
the US, but the US maintained military bases on the island and continued to influence 
domestic politics overtly and covertly. Throughout its modern history the US military has 
been integral in shaping the political development of the Philippines.  
 The Japanese ravaged the Philippines along with much of East Asia during 
WWII. An already significant communist force known as the Huks strengthened during 
the occupation. After the Japanese left the archipelago, Huk energies continued to focus 
on combating foreign powers and landed elites, but the focus now turned to agrarian land 
reform. The US in the post-war period became increasingly opposed to communist 
groups in general and agrarian reform was viewed as antithetical to US interests. Edward 
Lansdale of the US Air Force headed a fight against the Huks in the 1950s with “a mix of 
paramilitary operations, psychological warfare, and old-fashioned electoral politics, 
[which] was to become the prototype of US anti-Communist counterinsurgency wars 
elsewhere.”44 These operations went so far as to spread rumors in villages concerning the 
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presence of vampires amongst the Huks, assaulting a Huk on patrol, puncturing his neck 
with two holes and draining his blood, and then leaving him to be found by villagers.  
 Lansdale also had a direct and pivotal influence on Filipino politics, providing 
vital support for the election of Ramon Magsaysay over the incumbent Elpidio Quirino. 
Quirino was viewed by Lansdale and other US diplomats as far too corrupt. Lansdale 
solicited funds for Magsaysay’s campaign from both the CIA (US $1 million) and US 
firms with lasting interests in the Philippines such as Coca-Cola. Numerous CIA 
operatives also worked directly for Magsaysay’s campaign. This coalition of US 
economic and political power also contributed to the establishment of the National 
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) during this period, which eventually played a 
pivotal role in the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos and the subsequent movement towards 
more democratic institutions.45 Military leaders since Lansdale have not had nearly as 
significant and direct a role in Philippine politics, but the effects of military bases in the 
Philippines have been comparatively thorough and lasting.   
 After WWII, the US Clark and Subic Bay military installations in the Philippines 
became the largest such bases in the world, particularly during the escalation of the 
Vietnam War. The standard explanation given by US foreign policy makers was that the 
bases were needed to remain geopolitically relevant. Towns near bases saw large 
increases in populations with the primary employers being the bases themselves and the 
neighboring bars. One such town, Olongapo, increased from 40,000 to 200,000 residents 
from 1966-76 with almost no industrial development. While protests periodically erupted 
during Marcos’ tenure that sought to expel the American military forces, many more 
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Filipinos accepted the bases because of the economic benefits that came with them. 
Although tales of exploitation and cruelty toward Filipinos by American troops were 
frequent,46 the bases also employed 43,000 Filipinos not counting the external service 
industry that thrived on the troops from the bases. Altogether the installations were 
estimated to contribute $200 million to the Filipino economy each year,47 a total that does 
not include the large military and economic aid given to Marcos in order to allow the 
bases to remain.  
The bases remained in the Philippines until Marcos’ electoral defeat and flight 
from the country, which was followed by resistance to the prolonged US military 
presence and installations. President Aquino forced US troops out of the country within a 
few years of taking office in 1986, with the last of US marines ordered to leave the Subic 
Bay base in 1992.48 The 47-year existence of these bases had a profound economic and 
cultural impact on the Philippines. Just as important was the economic aid provided to 
Marcos and the strength of the alliance with the US that the base presence enabled. Both 
factors helped Marcos maintain his grip on the country for as long as he did. 
US Politicians and Politics 
 American politicians and diplomats had a stronger and more direct influence on 
the politics of the Philippines than the US military. Marcos’ rule spanned five US 
presidencies, from Lyndon Johnson to Ronald Reagan. All of these administrations had 
direct contact, influence, and varying levels of confidence in Ferdinand and Imelda 
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Marcos. The political support provided by the administrations underpinned Marcos’ rule 
until Reagan wavered under growing pressure in the US to abandon the autocrat and 
reluctantly withdrew his political support. This national and personal closeness bred 
political dependence, which in turn led to a stark lack of a strong bureaucratic class in the 
Philippines.49 This ultimately made the Philippines highly unstable and underdeveloped 
following the withdrawal of the US crutch.  
 The US fostered relationships with a burgeoning oligarchy and perpetuated this 
class with private sector ventures from the outset of colonial rule. “Under the American 
regime, the oligarchy consolidated itself into a national force, took control of the central 
government in Manila, and responded to countless new opportunities for enrichment.”50 
But these opportunities were exogenous to state development. The stronger the oligarchy 
became, the better it was at plundering the country and further minimizing the role of the 
bureaucracy, particularly when at the behest of US investors. The lack of a strong 
bureaucracy inhibited the possibility of piecemeal economic reform given that all 
decision making was centralized with Marcos. This patrimonial, oligarchic rule also 
inhibited the emergence of new social forces that might otherwise be expected to grow 
along with high levels of foreign aid, investment, and growth. These social forces might 
have otherwise been the basis for piecemeal political reforms.51 
 Establishing and maintaining this political structure may be the most lasting 
impact of US activities in the Philippines. From independence through the fall of Marcos, 
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the US has further solidified the power structure of the Philippines through an often 
pivotal electoral influence. As mentioned above, Magsaysay experienced extensive US 
support from multiple channels in the 1953 presidential election. Garcia, Magsaysay’s 
vice president, ruled following Magsaysay’s death in ’57, who then lost to US-backed 
Macapagal in ’61, with Macapagal losing to Marcos in ’65. The US took a particular 
interest in courting Marcos’ favor at the time because of the Vietnam War. LBJ sent vice 
president Humphrey to Marcos’ presidential inauguration to personally congratulate 
Marcos, an action that was not standard procedure for VPs. This was the beginning of 
what might be termed a ‘chummy’ relationship between Marcos and the long series of US 
administrations that would follow. The Carter administration, which always emphasized 
bettering human rights, pursued a human rights policy (or lack thereof) that was akin to 
Reagan’s in the Philippines.52 VP Mondale went to the country and instead of supporting 
fair and open balloting for the 1978 elections, supported Marcos’ repression of an open 
ballot and would only covertly meet with opposition candidates.53 These were not 
isolated policy positions, but indicative of the lengths to which US leaders were willing 
to go to stay in Marcos’ good graces. 
US Economic Influence 
 Economic actors have also enjoyed a privileged and strong influence in the 
Philippines, particularly since the American led reconstruction efforts following WWII. 
Americans’ parity privilege in capital ownership in the country was a somewhat unique 
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and overarching part of the rehabilitation agreement. This may make the Philippines a 
biased case study for the types of economic-based mechanisms that I find, as foreign 
capital has been much more prevalent here. It is more useful, however, to think of the 
Philippines as an endemic case of military, political, and economic influence. FDI has 
been notable in how much it has contributed to the rents and subsequent acquisition of 
power by Filipino elites and thereby intertwined with domestic political outcomes. These 
microeconomic mechanisms are augmented by macro-level economic pressures with the 
combined influence of domestic technocrats, the World Bank, the IMF, foreign donors, 
and foreign investors being able to essentially dictate policy for much of the period in 
question.54 So while the Philippines is not a representative case of the reach of US 
economic interests, it is useful in highlighting many of the channels through which US 
capital can constrain and influence domestic politics.  
 The Philippine economy was destroyed during WWII and the US responded with 
the Tydings Rehabilitation Act of 1946. US $620 million was sent to the country for 
reconstruction and was tied to the Bell Trade Act. This agreement included provisions 
precluding various barriers to trade, forbidding nationalist economic activities, and, most 
importantly, assuring parity rights for US citizens.55 Parity rights included access to 
natural resources and investment opportunities for US citizens and corporations on the 
same levels afforded to Filipino citizens. These loose economic controls and openness to 
US capital structured the reemerging economy around agricultural and primary product 
production with little focus on manufactured goods. Most FDI went into agricultural 
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production specifically for export.56 The primary sectors of agricultural products have 
traditionally been coconuts (supplying 82% of world demand and 20% of Filipino 
wages), sugar, and fruit products. MNCs have been major players in all of these sectors, 
particularly for fruit products. 
 While not as large or important for the Filipino economy as the coconut or sugar 
industries, the fruit products industry was a larger source of political constraint for 
Marcos due to the concentration of the sector among a few corporations. The sector was 
dominated by three MNCs: Del Monte Corporation, the United Fruit Company, and 
Castle and Cooke, all of which are US based. The power of these foreign investors, in 
particular, was so ingrained as a vital part in a “triple alliance” scenario that it precluded 
Marcos from subjugating the investors to his political wont.57 Much of the time, political 
elites acted in concert with these economic entities in buying out landowners to expand 
plantations, push down wages, and forbid labor unions.58 The size and aggressiveness of 
these MNCs constrained Marcos and placed him in direct conflict with the working class 
in ways that would not have existed without the MNCs’ ventures.  
 Prior elite networks based on family ties or mere proximity and familiarity were 
also disrupted by a large influx of foreign investors. The incursion of foreign investment 
was largely due to a devaluation of the Filipino peso and came from many sources, but 
especially the US. This large number of new investors changed the incentives of local 
elites and led to a breakdown in elite cohesion.59 While there is a pedigree in the 
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literature arguing that a strong elite in favor of democratic reforms is necessary for 
democracy,60 another related mechanism is a lack of elite cohesion and political power 
that is subjugated by foreign actors. Under an authoritarian government, these foreign 
actors will support the regime in power as this stabilizes the environment for their 
investment, but this type of relationship becomes more ambiguous following significant 
shocks.  
 US graft and collusion with Marcos extended into other spheres beyond 
agriculture and to an extent that severely hindered the development of the country. The 
construction of the Westinghouse nuclear power plant in Bataan is the best example: 
… in 1975 Marcos authorized construction of the plant that ultimately 
could cost $2.3 billion… Westinghouse is alleged to have paid $17.5 
million to Herminio Disini, who got Marcos to give the contract to 
Westinghouse; Marcos is accused of making $80 million in kickbacks. 
The plant, to be built on a dormant volcano, lies near several earthquake 
fault lines and is just sixty miles from Manila. An international team of 
inspectors visiting the plant after Marcos’s fall described it as unsafe, 
inoperable, and three times the price of a comparable plant Westinghouse 
built in South Korea at the same time.61 
 
The plant has never been brought online. Marcos, elites close to Marcos, and 
Westinghouse all benefited greatly from this project and everything came from public 
coffers and financing through foreign loans. Perhaps the worst implication of this travesty 
is that the vast sums of money could have actually gone to real infrastructure projects 
instead of yielding nothing, even if many of the loans were ultimately forgiven. Such 
projects were not tightly held secrets. The populace knew of the corruption, formed weak 
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opposition pressure groups because of it, and given the proper catalyst shortly thereafter 
turned into a viable and successful opposition.  
 Overall, US economic actors were pervasive and their influence was quite 
multifaceted. Sometimes these political effects were intentional and sometimes took the 
form political externalities of economic activities. While many of the major ventures had 
close ties to US diplomats, it would be naïve to think that all of these investors 
intentionally colluded in their influences and pressures on the country. Instead, I make a 
broad claim about the general economic interest of foreign capital that pressure for 
political stability as a means towards a stable investment environment. Individual 
corporations and actors within corporations could have independent effects on political 
institutions as well, but unearthing conclusive evidence for any such behavior is beyond 
the scope of this project. 
Domestic Politics and the Fall of Marcos 
 We have just seen the strong support that US actors in every sphere provided to 
the Marcos regime. With this underwriting and Marcos’ bouts of martial law, it is easy to 
understand how Marcos was able to hold on to power for his 20-year reign. The local 
public realized little gain in any realm during the Marcos era except through 
organizational capacity building around a common rancor for Marcos. Both the regime 
and opposition knew of the growing economic problems, which were due to large debt 
burdens and general economic mismanagement. This spurred the opposition leader 
Benigno Aquino Jr., exiled for the previous three years to the US, to return to the country 
in 1983 despite personal discouragement by Imelda Marcos who maintained a close 
relationship with Aquino. Ultimately, however, Aquino did not listen. Aquino was 
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assassinated minutes after landing in Manila and the public generally suspected or 
understood someone within the Marcos regime to be the perpetrator.  
Benigno’s wife Corazon Aquino filled the role of opposition leader as the head of 
the “People Power Movement” on a rising tide of support and mourning for her husband. 
Marcos called snap elections in 1985 and was forced into exile in Hawaii following the 
victory of Corazon Aquino. Throughout this period, domestic political factors were the 
most important factor leading to Marcos’ downfall, but the loss of support from Ronald 
Reagan and the strong oversight of the elections also chipped away at Marcos’ power 
base. US capital interests in the Philippines contributed directly to both of these processes 
in addition to setting the stage for his fall from grace.  
 The years of graft and corruption at the highest levels of government had crippled 
the country economically. Manufacturing was virtually non-existent, with the economy 
being driven primarily by agribusiness and resource extraction, neither of which yielded 
high income jobs nor facilitated significant technology transfers that could lead to 
compounding efficiency gains. The result was underdevelopment and massive inequality 
in the distribution of resources. Even foreign aid for the impoverished was always sent 
through the regime and whittled down to nearly nothing before it reached the populace. 
On one hand, this crippled the proletariat, rendering them unable to confront elites. On 
another, the actions brought together the non-elite opposition to Marcos that could be 
activated given the proper leadership and resources. But as long as all those that 
controlled the resources benefitted from keeping Marcos in power, they were unlikely to 
support any opposition movement.  
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 Prior to the assassination of Aquino, however, Marcos had been losing the vital 
support of both foreign and domestic business interests in the Philippines. Violent 
outbursts were staged by the government and used as an excuse for the imposition of 
martial law in 1972.62 But the ultimate goals of martial law were to quell nationalist 
pressures, to push the country towards a more outwardly-oriented economy, and to better 
abide by IMF and World Bank prescriptions all at once. This stabilized the Philippines in 
the short term, but also served to foment future conflicts. Marcos reappropriated much 
privately owned capital to family and friends much to the distaste of import-substituting 
interests, who supported a military coup.63 Unsurprisingly, these crony firms then 
enjoyed even stronger import-substituting tariff protections than previous owners, further 
undermining efforts to increase exports which remained constant relative to GDP over 
this period.64 Many of the same firms began to fail in the early ‘80s and required bailouts, 
which led to the fall of many cronies who were running the companies. The situation 
finally precipitated in a balance of payments crisis that was prompted by the flight of 
capital following the Aquino assassination in 1983,65 as seen somewhat in Figure 4 (data 
from this period is sparse and unreliable, but some effect from the assassination is still 
visible in the data). This led to a large IMF restructuring program implemented in 1984 
that further constrained Marcos and aimed to revitalize the alienated private sector. But 
Marcos then fueled the fire by blaming the crisis on tax evasion in the private sector. 
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 Thus Marcos sowed the seeds for his own downfall through cronyism and 
economic mismanagement, including affronts to private business interests that included 
foreign investors. The assassination of Aquino further rattled businesses and caused 
capital flight, further undermining Marcos’ legitimacy. The opposition rallied around this 
laundry list of grievances and placed pressure on Marcos up until the snap elections in 
1985. US policy makers were mostly divided along party lines, with the Reagan 
administration and Republicans standing by Marcos and Democrats pushing for Aquino.  
 
Figure 4: Capital Flight from the Philippines Following Aquino Assassination 
 
Marcos claimed victory based on the sham results of the snap election which 
officially had Marcos winning some districts with 100% of the vote. It was common 
knowledge that Marcos had stolen the election, but the supporting evidence for these 
claims came from the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), 
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which provided volunteer oversight of the elections. NAMFREL had its roots in earlier 
elections from the ‘50s (see above). The CIA remained a primary source of funds for 
NAMFREL through the ‘80s, which activated hundreds of thousands of volunteers during 
the snap election. Another significant source of funding for NAMFREL was Republicans 
Abroad, a group meant to maintain political connections amongst Republican nationals 
abroad, which consisted primarily of US businessmen living in the Philippines.66 Some of 
the funds were also not given directly to election monitoring, but instead given to the 
Reform the Armed Forces Movement which for some time had sought to eliminate 
corruption in the military. Regardless, without the strong funding from the CIA and US 
business interests in the Philippines, it is difficult to say whether NAMFREL could have 
provided sufficient oversight and subsequent evidence to confidently declare the election 
fraudulent. Nevertheless, the funding indirectly bolstered the position of the opposition 
movement that quickly swept Marcos out of power and into exile.  
 Republicans Abroad also had a direct influence on US politicians and played an 
influential role in swaying US policy in the Philippines. In particular, Republicans 
Abroad possessed direct lines of communication with the Reagan administration. 
Generally, Republicans had stood by Marcos since he had been such a loyal ally to the 
US over the years, with the notable exception of Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana. Lugar 
led a delegation to the Philippines and witnessed the fraudulent results alongside 
NAMFREL. Lugar was then instrumental in conveying this message back to the US. But 
Lugar’s reports did not single-handedly sway Reagan to withdraw his support for 
Marcos. Indeed, this was only part of the mounting pressure on Reagan to abandon the 
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long-time US ally. When questioned about the unwavering support of Marcos after 
meeting with Lugar, Reagan officials tended to detract from Aquino67 and argue that 
Marcos is a necessary evil.68 Republicans Abroad was another source of pressure on the 
president arguing, “But, Mr. President, the Republicans are for Cory. She’s a 
Republican.”69 Of course this is not a causal story as it is difficult to say precisely what 
the deciding factor was in Reagan’s decision making, but it is reasonable to assume that 
pressures within his own political base and from the societal actors in the Philippines had 
far more influence than widespread knowledge of election fraud in the US. Indeed, it was 
generally understood that the elections had been fraudulent well before Reagan decided 
to abandon Marcos. 
Popular Discontent and International Constraints 
 The role of international actors in much of the democratization literature is 
ambiguous and often ignored. In the case of the Philippines, we find that the influence of 
foreign economic actors, rather than being ambiguous, is time-variant and highly 
conditional on domestic political circumstances. Where relative stability exists, US firms 
invested in industries that made economic sense (i.e., in which profit margins are high 
enough relative to risk of loss and risk of reappropriation by the regime), which in the 
Philippines was primarily agricultural. But as the presence of US-FDI increased, 
unabated in quality or quantity, the effect it had on the political economy of the 
Philippines became more pronounced and multifaceted. Those close to Marcos were 
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enriched through graft, income inequality increased dramatically, Marcos was 
constrained to actions that did not impede upon the interests of foreign capital, political 
and economic dependence on the US grew, and the lower classes were given a common 
cause with which to unite. The debt crisis and assassination of opposition leader Aquino 
goaded opposition groups into action and encouraged them to form into a viable political 
opponent. But the fall of Marcos was by no means assured by the organization of a viable 
opposition. The oversight of the elections by NAMFREL and the subsequent withdrawal 
of support from the Reagan Administration were pivotal in Marcos’ decision to cede 
power and flee the country. US businesses with ventures in the Philippines provided 
support in both these realms and did so against dominant tides within their own political 
party. It is important to note that this support was not merely for the opposition to a 
dictator that was already falling out of favor, but included directed support toward 
democratic procedures in the form of fair elections in addition to support for an 
opposition candidate that espoused the creation of more democratic institutions. 
 The extent of influence that US businesses, and US interests in general, had in the 
Philippines is highly abnormal. While US-FDI was present in the country and did 
influence political outcomes it is difficult to say how strong these effects were relative to 
the other direct influences the US had over the country over the extended period of 
Marcos’ rule. To partially address this qualm this study will now address Indonesia, 
which has not experienced the same extent of direct political influence as the Philippines 
and has experienced different forms of pressure coming from US capital interests. 
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Indonesia 
 The direct effect of US-FDI on domestic politics is less apparent in Indonesia than 
in the Philippines. This is not to say that similar effects did not exist, but convincingly 
unearthing them is more difficult. Related to FDI, however, is portfolio investment and 
foreign-based loans. As discussed in the introduction above, there is reason to believe 
that FDI will have more of a direct impact on domestic level politics as, by definition, 
FDI is a lasting interest in the country and politics are a lasting enterprise. Short-term 
portfolio investments and loans, however, may also have indirect or less intentional 
political effects. These short term investments are also highly correlated with FDI, but 
indicate a different type of investment pattern. Because of this correlation it would be 
difficult to include portfolio investment in the models of the quantitative section because 
of multicollinearity problems, but, as we will see below, portfolio investment was quite 
important in the downfall of Suharto. Short term portfolio investment effects will be more 
pronounced in countries with high foreign debt levels and trade openness with Western 
countries. Indonesia is just such a country. And it was this same set of conditions that 
made it particularly susceptible to the collapse of the Thai baht and the subsequent Asian 
financial crisis. During that time there was massive capital flight from affected nations 
and Indonesia was, by many measures, the hardest hit. The widespread student-led 
protests following fuel price hikes were a direct cause of the fall of Suharto and the 
ushering of more democratic institutions, but the role that US investment played before 
and during the transition in Indonesia is similar in effect to what took place in the 
Philippines. 
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 The democratic transition in Indonesia was spurred by the financial crisis and 
built on the widespread discontent for the Suharto regime. Much of this angst was fueled 
by endemic patronage and cronyism, but the regime was able to stave off these pressures 
through consistently strong economic growth and direct support from the US. Following 
the fall of the Soviet Union, US politicians had less of an interest in propping up friendly 
autocrats like Suharto and the Clinton administration had more of an interest in 
promoting liberalism of all sorts everywhere. Investors still wanted to maintain a stable 
investment climate in the country, but with the uncertainty that came with the Asian 
financial crisis, investors first exasperated the crisis through capital flight. Then through 
IMF restructuring programs, in which US investors had personal interests and the US 
treasury played a leadership role, US capital pushed for political decentralization as one 
means to make the country more stable and open to foreign investment. As we will see in 
the conclusion, this pressure did not ultimately have the desired political effect, but the 
intentionality of political decentralization was still present.   
US Politicians and Politics  
 Dutch colonial rule of Indonesia was disrupted during WWII with Japanese 
occupation of the country from 1943-1945. Following the departure of Japanese troops in 
1945, national forces declared independence and embarked on a war that lasted until 
1949 and resulted in formal independence in the country. Sukarno became president of 
the country and was largely influenced by the policies of Maoist China, but shifted more 
to the Soviet Bloc by the ‘60s. Indonesia became a darling in the eyes of US policy 
makers around 1966 primarily due to the polarization of global politics and the escalating 
Vietnam War. But despite this similarity with the Philippines, the country never 
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experienced the effects of a large US military presence the same way the Philippines had. 
With the ascendency of Suharto over Sukarno in 1966 and the vast oil reserves in 
Indonesia, the country became a prize ally during the Cold War.70 This helps to explain 
both the quick reentry into the UN following the rise of the New Order regime under 
Suharto and the vast quantities of aid that flooded into the country. Indeed, by 1970 
Indonesia was the second-largest recipient of foreign aid in the world71 and aid has 
continued to increase throughout its modern history. Throughout, Indonesia remained an 
important ally for the US, for both geostrategic reasons and to retain access to the large 
natural resource reserves.  
 Much of Suharto’s success was due to the adept macroeconomic management of 
his chief technocrats. The team of reformers were trained in US universities, largely UC-
Berkeley, and thus dubbed the “Berkeley Mafia.” In addition to the trade and 
development strategies that opened the country to more investment, tighter fiscal and 
monetary policy was implemented in order to tame the hyperinflation that followed from 
the mismanagement under the Sukarno regime. Inflation was calmed from 636% in 1966 
to 9% four years later in 1970.72 Overall, these technocrats adopted policies that bore a 
close resemblance to the neoliberal thinking that was gaining ground in Western circles. 
The role of technocrats became institutionally entrenched during this period and had great 
influence over Suharto’s policy decisions up until the financial crisis of the 1990s. The 
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significant influence that the technocrats had in propitiating US economic ideology in 
Indonesia made for a natural alliance between the countries. 
Whereas the Marcos regime ended largely as a result of the loss of support from 
the Reagan administration in the face of widespread protests, the seeds of Suharto’s fall 
were planted with the oil crisis and harvested during Clinton’s administration. Reagan’s 
push for widespread deregulation everywhere in the world caused the private sector to 
eclipse government as a driver of economic growth in the ‘80s. Both domestic and 
foreign investors had a significant presence in the country, but deregulation enabled 
Suharto to make cronyistic power grabs through family and friends due to the sheer level 
of resources at his disposal, alienating many allies in these sectors.  
The fall of the Soviet Union then caused US foreign policy to shift, primarily 
under Clinton, from a focus on combating communism across countries irrespective of 
economic policy to an emphasis on aid packages being conditioned on within-country 
reforms. In the prior period, Suharto could do as he pleased domestically as long as he 
supported US interests on an international stage. Under Clinton, movements towards 
political liberalization were a precondition for aid and investment and Suharto’s external 
political outlook became less important.73 While Reagan was a staunch supporter of 
Marcos, the Clinton administration was only a luke-warm supporter of stability in 
Indonesia as a whole, regardless of political leadership, and pushed for political 
liberalization where possible. When an opportunity presented itself through IMF 
restructuring programs, US officials pushed for broad-based political decentralization 
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amongst other reforms. Decentralization on the scale proposed was anathema to Suharto 
maintaining his grip on the country, as it meant a diffusion of political power to local 
politicians, despite US officials publicly attesting to their support of Suharto.   
The combined effect of the economic changes leading up to the crisis significantly 
constrained Suharto and determined much of the political change that would be possible 
following the end of the regime. First, the concentration of economic power in the class 
of elites close to Suharto ensured the existence of a class that could withstand the 
financial crisis that would hit in the late ‘90s. This concentration of power also further 
strained a populace already well accustomed to elite control of resources and political 
oppression. So while Suharto’s circle became empowered and further enriched, the circle 
shrank in size and grew in concentration. The projects required to appease this group then 
grew in magnitude, but also had less reach amongst the populace in general. 
Many of the business interests in Indonesia were so intertwined in both the 
politics and investment projects that it becomes difficult to detach where US political 
influence ends and US economic influence begins. But what is true is that these large 
conglomerates survived on patronage networks in which the political and economic were 
mutually constitutive entities. A prime example is The Sudarpo Group, which was 
comprised of 32 member firms. After being a chief contributor to an anti-Japanese 
occupation group, Sudarpo Sastrosatomo became a member of Sukarno’s Ministry of 
Information and served a diplomatic role in the US from 1948-52. Upon returning to 
Indonesia he established the Sudarpo Corporation and benefited greatly from Sukarno’s 
nationalization of Dutch firms by buying a Dutch shipping company. Sudarpo fostered 
close relationships with Suharto’s future vice president, US Steel, and the Socialist Party 
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of Indonesia, drawing on all to maintain a significant influence in governmental affairs. 
Sudarpo’s corporate empire was able to withstand the decline of both Sukarno and 
Suharto by remaining involved in industries that were vital parts of Indonesia’s economy 
and by securing the backing of the US. This was done through relationships with US 
politicians that Sudarpo had developed while a diplomatic representative for Indonesia in 
the US. This situation stands in stark contrast to Chinese businesses in the country that 
were locally grown and depended mostly on local connections for their success. Such 
Chinese ventures did not emerge from the various crises and political changes as well as 
conglomerates like Sudarpo which maintained strong connections to the US.74  
US political influence in Indonesia has been much more subtle and complex than 
that in the Philippines, where political pressure was full-on from all directions. 
Connections with US politicians helped prop up many Indonesian conglomerates and 
Suharto alike. At the same time, however, maintaining these connections constrained 
Suharto’s actions before and during the various crises. He could not focus solely on 
shoring up local political support, but had to balance these interests against foreign 
policy-makers as well. More importantly and more indicative of post-Cold War global 
politics, however, is that Indonesia saw a thorough intertwining of the economic and 
political realms to a greater extent than Marcos faced during the run up to Suharto’s fall. 
Clinton emphasized geopolitical interests, but combating communism took a far back seat 
to fostering a stable investment environment; Suharto’s usefulness to security advisors 
and investors alike ran dry when economic stability was in doubt. 
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US Economic Influence  
Throughout its modern history, economic growth and development in Indonesia 
has relied heavily on foreign capital75 and access to markets in developed countries for 
manufactures and natural resources. Following independence in 1950, the US and other 
European markets displaced the Netherlands as the primary destinations for Indonesian 
exports, particularly rubber and oil.76 This was accompanied by a long process of 
nationalization of the larger Dutch firms, which lasted through the fall of Sukarno. 
Through the mid-‘80s, Japan and the US were the country’s largest trade partners and 
accounted for 30% and 15% of Indonesian trade, respectively.77 A majority of the largest 
businesses in the country also had some level of joint venture exposure with foreign 
capital, although this never reached a “dependency level.”78 Nevertheless, the withdrawal 
of capital during the crisis and how severely that withdrawal imperiled Indonesia proves 
that on some level the Indonesian economy was dependent on foreign investors, largely 
those of the US and China.  
These high levels of foreign investment, however, caused unrest over the years as 
Indonesians had yet to forget the brutal experiences under Japanese occupation and Dutch 
colonial rule. This was particularly true of the experience with the Japanese, whose 
money was perceived to be particularly influential in the New Order growth spurt under 
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Suharto.79 Thus in the early 1970s, after a period of reopening with Suharto’s rise, the 
government began to implement stricter limitations on the amount of influence foreign 
capital could play in the domestic economy. This took the form of import substitution 
(ISI) policies meant to bolster domestic producers into competition with foreign industry 
and higher government investment in development programs. These policies typically 
took the form of restrictive trade policies that limited imports and direct government 
intervention in propping up “infant” industries that needed to reach economies of scale in 
order to compete with established MNCs. But ISI policies were followed with ever 
greater interventionist actions such as creating state owned enterprises in industries the 
government deemed important or strategic, particularly in the oil industry with the 
establishment of (the state-run oil company) Pertamina.  
Beyond Pertamina, Indonesia also possessed a booming oil industry that inflated 
government revenues throughout the period and was the major source of funding for 
broad-based development programs. Social programs grew along with oil revenue, both 
in real terms and relative to the funding of the import substitution policies within the 
development budget. From 1970-1984, the percent of the development budget dedicated 
to education, health care, and family planning rose from 11% to 19%80 and long 
neglected infrastructure also received much needed attention. Just as important as the 
increased levels of investment in social and physical infrastructure, however, is the 
method by which the centralized government instituted these new policies. The Inpres 
program, or Presidential Instruction program, focused on the development of poor 
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regions outside of the government’s central power base on Java. But rather than being 
strict central directives, funds were instead funneled through local government 
institutions with leeway in implementation.81 This served the dual purposes of 
legitimizing local public administration in the eyes of the populace and bought the loyalty 
of low-level politicians in the poorer regions of the country for Suharto.  
In the mid-70s, both the ISI policies and the large social development programs 
that came with oil revenues were disrupted by the bankruptcy and subsequent bailout of 
Pertamina.82 While this in itself was a relative blip on the history of development in the 
country that briefly delayed social projects through sapping the development funds for a 
bailout of the company, it was indicative of the excessive reliance of Indonesia on oil 
revenues and the possibly negative implications of high resource endowments. Later, in 
1986 the price of oil dropped by about 50% resulting in a drop in Indonesia’s national 
income by 5%.83 This shock contributed to the adoption of Reagan’s push for 
deregulation more than any other event.84  
The oil-price shock forced the regime to reevaluate industrial policy and 
implement a strategy that reduced the country’s overexposure to oil by becoming more 
export-oriented. Adopting export-orientation as a strategy to getting out of the oil trap 
was multifaceted. It included formal incentives to export and loosening of exchange rate 
policies, and most importantly it also include a loosening of a previously strict divestment 
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rule that forced foreign firms to find Indonesian nationals to purchase an ownership stake 
in foreign based ventures within a short period of initial investment. A clear parallel can 
be drawn between the loosening of Indonesia’s divestment rule and the Philippines’ 
parity rule for US citizens in that both gave foreign investors much greater access 
towards funneling capital into the countries. In general, the financial deregulations of this 
period led to future bubbles in the banking industry and proved to have the greatest 
impact through the Asian financial crisis. Bouncing back from the oil-price shock and the 
push for greater export orientation, however, required help from the outside in addition to 
domestic level policy liberalization.  
The role of oil in the political process and timing of democratization in Indonesia 
deserves special mention. Some scholars argue that having a significant oil sector 
impedes democracy.85 They contend that social spending programs through higher 
government revenue, i.e. Inpres, mitigate what otherwise would have been social 
pressure for democracy and autocrats have no other incentives to liberalize politics. 
Further, they maintain that any potential modernization effect that might happen through 
higher levels of education and employment in higher income industry is sapped by 
citizens who are able to consume more without significant changes in employment. 
However, a major focus of the Inpres program was increasing education and access to 
greater economic opportunity. With that in mind, it would seem that this perspective is 
overly simplistic and fails to account for variance in the type of social program that is 
being implemented. The relevance to the question at hand is that the large oil industry 
may have been the primary impediment to democracy and, following its relative decline 
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in importance, democracy became more likely in the late ‘90s. There is reason to believe 
that oil was clearly not the only factor impeding democracy, however, if it impeded the 
emergence of democracy at all. If anything, it is the investors in the oil industry that took 
over after the fall of Pertamina and their close relationship with Suharto that propped up 
the autocratic regime in lieu of democratization. Where oil is found to hinder democracy 
it is most likely a combination of these factors: high cash-payouts to citizens, low 
institutional reinvestment, and conservative foreign investors interested in maintaining a 
stable investment environment. In Indonesia, the only clear effect of the oil sector is that 
investors and long-lasting oil interests in Indonesia solidified Suharto’s position.  
Aid from Western powers also helped to prop up Suharto by enabling the country 
to maintain a balanced budget and, when paired with the increased confidence of foreign 
investors, leading to high growth rates averaging 7% from 1967-73.86 The strategic 
closeness to Japan and its pro-capitalist leanings, however, made the continued 
development of Indonesia a geostrategic priority for the US. Thus aid continued to 
increase during this period, making Indonesia the highest aid recipient in the world in the 
90s.87 Without strong and persistent aid from the US, Indonesia would likely not have 
been able to develop a strong export-orientation. So too, Suharto may not have been able 
to keep his grip on power without this aid. Or if he managed to retain power without the 
aid, he would have would had the luxury of much greater policy flexibility at the height 
of the financial crisis due to lower constraints from donors.  
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Thus one finds that the presence of US-capital and aid augmented Suharto’s 
political position in complex and time-variant ways. While there was no coordinated 
assault from different actors and often the most influential actors were off-shore entities, 
Indonesia has experienced significant exposure to both US investors and political 
pressures. 
Domestic Politics, the IMF, and the Fall of Suharto 
The beginning of the end for Suharto started in Thailand with the fall of the Thai 
baht. Unlike in Thailand, however, the crisis in Indonesia did not start with over 
leveraged loans on the part of local banks. In Indonesia the majority of corporate debt 
was held by foreign banks and so the crisis hit the financial sector after beginning in the 
real sector. Investor confidence in the region wavered as uncertainty about Suharto’s 
policy commitments eventually led to vast capital flight. Suharto, however, quickly made 
commitments to cutting many crony projects, ending tariffs, and freeing the exchange 
rate of the rupiah from its peg to the dollar. But these commitments only stemmed 
bleeding from the rupiah for a couple of months after the crisis started in earnest in July 
of ‘97. As we can see in Figure 5, FDI was slower to take flight than portfolio investment 
and also slower to get back to pre-crisis levels 
Continued investor skittishness in the region, however, led to further drops in the 
rupiah in October and forced the regime to seek assistance from the IMF shortly 
thereafter in the form of a $23 billion dollar package. But the IMF agreement required 
further cuts into crony projects and Suharto started to display inconsistencies between 
what he agreed to cut with the IMF and what projects still received his approval. The 
proposed budget of January ‘98 disappointed the IMF and investors alike. As investors 
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fled from Suharto, essentially voting with their dollars, representatives from the US 
treasury and IMF visited the country to try to prop up the dying regime. The visit proved 
futile as now nothing except Suharto’s departure could ensure a return of investor 
confidence.88 
 
Figure 5: Capital Flight from Indonesia Following Financial Crisis 
 
The political flash point, however, did not start with the internationally born and 
propitiated financial crisis. Student protests erupted following large fuel price hikes that 
ran abreast of the IMF restructuring program. The more general focus of the protests was 
the extensive role of foreign investors and businesses in the country. There was a 
widespread perception that foreigners yielded most of the economic gains in what had 
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been a rapidly developing country. Beginning with the Dutch and lasting through 
Japanese occupation, astute Chinese businessmen, and prolonged US MNC activity, 
Indonesia had a long-latent nationalist presence. Chinese nationals bore the greatest brunt 
of the violence of the protests and the presence of Chinese investors in the country 
subsequently dropped further than most. In response to these uprisings, the long 
complacent parliament called for the impeachment of Suharto, who subsequently 
resigned from the presidency after a 32 year reign.89 
The power vacuum left by Suharto was filled, although somewhat inadequately, 
by the Indonesian parliament. The rise of parliament brought with it a rehashing of some 
of the organizational problems that the same body faced during the Sukarno era. The 
IMF’s purveyance and liberalizing influence ensured that there would not be another 
slide towards socialist policies, but the widely divergent interests across the islands, large 
population base, and sudden lack of central organization remains problematic to this day. 
This has, in turn, led to increases in bureaucratic excess and many opportunities for rent-
seeking activities that may have even surpassed those under Suharto’s rule. Overall, 
even-handed taxation and investment in development has become more difficult with the 
rise of democracy in Indonesia.90 The benefits of patronage have shifted from those with 
connections to the power holders to those who have the best combinations of pivotal 
connections and adequate resources to take advantage of the government’s spotty 
enforcement.   
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The IMF and Wall Street 
 So far it is clear that FDI had a stabilizing effect on Indonesia prior to the crisis, 
as also found in the Philippines, but what role that US capital played in the formative 
moments during and immediately following Suharto’s fall remains ambiguous. Here the 
story and evidence is markedly different than in the Philippines. First, there was much 
greater capital flight in the build-up to the fall of the autocrat in Indonesia. This meant 
that there was not as much of a lasting interest in the country at the exact moment of 
transition. But the violence funneled towards foreigners, especially the Chinese, 
following Suharto’s fuel-price hike also caused the physical flight of many investors that 
might have otherwise been in the country to influence political outcomes. More 
important, however, was the fact that the IMF was working closely with Indonesian 
economists and leaders in its post-Suharto recovery, and much of IMF policy was 
developed working in concert with the US Treasury and Wall Street firms. 
  Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, and Alan Greenspan all worked closely with the 
IMF to develop recovery packages. Prior to positions as economic advisor and Secretary 
of the Treasury, Rubin was co-chairman of Goldman-Sachs and after leaving the Clinton 
administration served briefly as chairman for Citigroup and then on the executive board. 
During this period, Summers was Rubin’s Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and 
Greenspan the chairman of the Federal Reserve. Rubin’s account of the crisis emphasizes 
the good side of IMF programs, places the blame for the severity of the crisis on 
Indonesian actors and the World Bank, and conflates economic and political goals of the 
IMF in his description.91 Throughout the crisis this group of individuals also had 
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continued interactions directly with Suharto, advising him and his aides on various 
policies. The group stated their first goal was restoring investor confidence in Indonesia 
through stabilizing the economy, but addressing corruption was a persistent component of 
plans to restore confidence. Therefore when Suharto aimed to shore up support of cronies 
by repegging the rupiah to the dollar and thereby ensure stable prices while cronies could 
sell off projects, the IMF convinced him to do otherwise. Perhaps hindsight is 20/20, but 
it is rather apparent that Suharto’s legitimacy was rooted in economic growth and his 
ability to expand the economy was rooted in his close connections to cronies; 
undermining the crony firms undermined Suharto’s political position. Rubin’s account 
does not belie explicit efforts to push Suharto out of office and appears to be ignorant of 
the political pressure these reforms put on Suharto, but the author does celebrate the 
democratic elections and steady strengthening that occurred after Suharto’s fall. These 
are considered goods that came of the IMF programs even if the economic impact of the 
structural adjustments was not as intended.92 The US Treasury forced the structural 
conditions under which the IMF programs to Indonesia were to be implemented with the 
intention “to create institutions and rules closer to those of Anglo-American capitalism 
and [those] more acceptable to US business.”93 And Wall Street was the chief influence 
in molding US Treasury policies in this direction with much of Clinton campaign funding 
coming from Wall Street and actors like Rubin running the show.94 
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 Hadiz and Robison argue that political decentralization95 was a long running 
policy standard for both the IMF and World Bank programs that have rarely had the 
desired effect. 96 Nevertheless, these overly general programs had variable effects on 
countries. Indonesia stands in stark contrast to the experiences in South Korea and 
Thailand in that politico-business conglomerates survived and were not sold to foreign 
investors. This was largely due to the political connections of these conglomerates at 
home and abroad and the decentralization of power in the country. Such conglomerates 
were usually more powerful and well connected than the local politicians on whose 
patronage they depended. This led to an economy driven by money-politics and business 
interests co-opting populist ideology. Hadiz and Robison claim that these results 
demonstrate that business interests were only ever interested in economic liberalism, not 
political liberalism. While this sole emphasis on economic liberalism could be true of 
locally based conglomerates and might have been the main goal of investors in general, 
US politicians with connections to large US investment firms obviously pushed for both 
types of liberalism, as Rubin shows, with stability being the overarching concern. There 
is little doubt that Indonesia has yet to consolidate its democracy, but the direct – if naïve 
– actions of the IMF and US investors clearly constrained Suharto into an unactionable 
position. Intentionality may not have been explicit, but the conflation of political and 
economic goals on the part of IMF, Treasury, and Wall Street forced Suharto out and 
pressured for more democratic institutions to emerge after his fall. As with the 
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Philippines, this explicit pressure for decentralization from US capital interests did not 
emerge until the crisis had hit.    
 Admittedly, pressure for greater political decentralization does not necessarily 
imply pressure for more democratic institutions. But it does entail is political and 
economic power leaving Suharto’s hands to be distributed amongst elites at lower rungs. 
At that juncture Suharto was already constrained to the point where his only claim on 
legitimacy was his ability to direct the country towards high growth rates. This policy 
was the final tack that removed Suharto’s political legitimacy, while also pressuring for a 
dispersion of political power, a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. 
While IMF policies did not necessarily push for democracy in the same, direct sense that 
foreign capital did in the Philippines, the presence of foreign capital pre-crisis and IMF 
policies during the crisis helped create the potential for the emergence of democratic 
institutions and provided the necessary impetus for a redistribution of power.  
Domestic factors drove the regime transition in Indonesia as they also did in the 
Philippines. Where US-FDI in the Philippines formally supported Aquino, high-level US 
economic actors with ties to investment firms informally and formally constrained 
Suharto’s actions and pressured for political decentralization after his fall. The evidence 
here stops short of demonstrating that US capital actually supported particular opposition 
forces that espouse more democratic institutions, as in the Philippines, but US-capital’s 
support of these principles in general has had quite similar effects. Both countries now 
have formal democracy that is laden with patronage and, arguably, less stable investment 
environments.97 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 The future of democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia remains unclear; the 
consolidation of democracy, continuation of the current patronage politics, or a fall back 
into autocracy are all possibilities for both countries. This thesis has demonstrated, 
however, that two autocratic leaders of varying success and political connections were 
constrained by foreign capital in similar ways before and during regime transitions, but 
through different channels of foreign capital. Foreign capital also had a distinct influence 
in each state over what institutions would emerge to replace the autocrats.  US capital and 
politicos behaving on its behalf played important roles in both transitional periods, but 
whether the goal of US capital was actual democracy or if the outcomes were truly 
democratic is ambiguous and depends on our definition of democracy. 
 Each index used in the quantitative analysis above employs a particular 
conception of democracy. Implicit in my case studies is also a loose conception of 
democracy that hinges on free and fair elections and peaceful transitions of power. This is 
a necessary assumption because a thicker consensus on what defines democracy is 
lacking in the literature. Is democracy a specific combination of formal institutions? Is it 
a level of participation amongst those that are to be represented? Is it something more 
abstract and tied to questions of equality in civil and economic rights? The flawed 
quantitative indices of democracy98 develop contending perspectives. Polity hinges on the 
characteristics of the executive branch. Vanhanen measures electoral participation and 
competition. Przeworski et al. focus on a set of binary rules that arguably describe fully 
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consolidated democracy (see footnote 31). Of the three, Polity was the only with no 
significant relationship with US FDI. At first glance this is odd considering that US FDI 
has been found to constrain executive actions first and foremost. There is some logic to 
this, however, given that the case studies researched in this thesis discovered mostly 
informal constraints from foreign capital. 
 These informal constraints stemming from foreign investors followed similar 
patterns in each country, even though they emerged through different channels. When 
unconstrained by exigent political or economic circumstances, increases in FDI lead to 
increases in rents extracted by elites. This bolsters rulers’ political positions in the short-
term, but also leads to dependence on these foreign sources of rents in the long-term. In 
particular, these foreign investors demand policies in line with free-trade and stable 
investment environments, which tends to run contrary to the interests of domestic labor. 
Elites can then maintain power until a significant exogenous shock occurs. The 
dependence on foreign investors then constrains the policy leeway of rulers and thus 
makes their exit from power more likely. At these junctures the specific characteristics of 
investments in the country influence which politicians emerge victorious and the form of 
future political institutions. Much of the impact found in this analysis happened through a 
greater likelihood of democratic elections. The Vanhanen and Przeworski et al. indices 
were significantly predicted by US-FDI. This is likely due to those indices hinging more 
on civil participation and the likelihood of power transitions, which the case studies both 
find to be correlated with US capital in particular.  
 If one chooses a ‘thicker’ conception of democracy, however, US capital might 
theoretically have a negative effect on democratic outcomes. For instance, foreign 
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investors might be expected to push for minimal redistribution of property and privileged 
access to natural resources. If we define democracy as equal access to politics, economic 
opportunities, and protection of citizens from excessive foreign pressures then foreign 
capital is undoubtedly a force for autocracy. Thus, the results of this project must be 
qualified by the fact that our Western, procedural understanding of democracy both in the 
abstract and especially in quantitative measures is heavily value laden towards free and 
fair elections rather than enduring civil or economic freedoms.  
 To this end, the influence of foreign capital after the respective democratization 
efforts has returned to something similar to its pre-transition role in the countries. I find 
that all forms of foreign capital have sought a stable investment environment and the 
highest degree of openness to trade and investment as possible. In autocratic systems in 
particular this can result in high-levels of rent being extracted by elites. These extra 
economic benefits serve at least three purposes in terms of political development: further 
empowerment of the autocrat through putting greater resources at the autocrat’s disposal 
and, by proxy, reducing the relative economic power of opposition groups; constraining 
of the autocrat’s policy choices to those that also fit within the preferences of the foreign 
capital, otherwise the autocrat could lose this now vital source of funds; and finally, the 
economic subjugation of lower classes that can serve to unite them around a common 
cause, such as the fall of Marcos and Suharto, in the Philippines and Indonesia, 
respectively. Foreign capital, over the long-run, thus creates a political dependence of the 
autocrat on capital which, when faced with political and/or economic shocks can lead to a 
political crisis.  
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 Once such a crisis has emerged, a period of political indeterminacy occurs where 
the various domestic political groups pressure to get their desired outcome. The 
institutional outcomes are by no means determined at this point. But I find that US capital 
pressures both for the autocrat to remain permanently removed from power and in favor 
of more democratic political structures. In the case of the Philippines this took the form 
of explicit oversight of democratic elections and direct and indirect stumping for an 
opposition candidate. In Indonesia, this effect was more muted and not as directly 
supportive of a particular opposition group. The pressure against Suharto and in support 
of more dispersed political and economic power was nevertheless clearly present.  
 The results of the case studies build well upon the broad-based statistical analysis 
carried out in the first section of this project. The long-term effects of US-FDI on 
democracy, when controlling for the reflection of democracy on FDI, are significant with 
two indices and insignificant with the other two. In every specification, however, the 
coefficient of US-FDI is positively related to the respective index of democracy and these 
estimates should be considered lower-bounds. This is in line with the main findings of the 
case studies: US-FDI does indeed solidify the political situation of autocrats in the short-
term, but it does not make countries more autocratic than they already were and, on a 
long enough timeline, generally leads to more democratic institutions. There are 
obviously many other variables, some country-specific others common between 
countries, that have an effect on political outcomes and FDI is by no means a check on all 
of those factors. However, the complementarity between the rigorous statistical analysis 
and case studies suggest that US-FDI has effects beyond other diffusion and 
modernization variables. Indeed, the evidence unearthed here suggests that country-
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specific economic variables, in addition to diffusion in general, may be an omitted 
variable in some of the more prominent modernization works that explains the spurious 
causation found between economic growth and democracy.  
 
 Patronage networks have taken on different patterns now that decision making in 
both Indonesia and the Philippines has been decentralized. Some business interests, both 
local and foreign, have even been noted for their romanticism of the autocratic eras and 
the stability and predictability of the time.99  Some may interpret this as a true distaste for 
the fickleness of democratic politics, but more likely is that unconsolidated democracy is 
too unpredictable: businesses are still adjusting to new sets of institutions and constraints, 
and capital is ill-equipped to deal with local instead of central politicians. This discontent 
may in turn prevent consolidated democracy. As the case studies above show, foreign 
capital remains relatively apolitical given investment stability, but when lacking stability 
it tends to step into the political fray.  
 My research is lacking in a few ways that warrant attention and could be the basis 
for future research. First are the data limitations. The FDI variables, in particular, most 
likely suffer from measurement error and comprise a relatively small data set. Since each 
country seems to have variable interactions with FDI, country-specific time-series 
analysis seems best suited for studying the dynamics of FDI and politics. But the 
available data spans too short a time period for this. A similar problem arises with 
introducing a variable for political stability, as is standard in many works. In these cases 
authors simply introduce a variable that is the number of periods since the country has 
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experienced a change in the value of the democracy index; the longer a regime has 
existed (stability) the more likely it is to remain in that same mold. But this is not 
possible with most countries in my sample due to the shortness and paucity of the data. 
Another viable extension would be to breakdown FDI by both country and sector. FDI in 
agriculture may have markedly different effects on a country than in manufacturing, 
especially if also taking into account the resources and labor endowments of the host 
country. Considering all this together, an ideal data set would have included all FDI 
inflows by country and sector for a longer period of time, a more complete diffusion 
variable interacted with FDI flows, and incorporated changes in sectoral endowments by 
country. A model based on this data with a similarly strong instrumental variable could 
develop a better, more nuanced story of the interaction between FDI and democracy. 
 On the qualitative side, ideal case studies could be done at the corporate and 
country level with ground-level research. For instance, establishing a connection with 
Dole and conducting interviews with managers and executives in charge of Latin 
American ventures could be highly informative in terms of foreign capital’s political 
intentionality. Talking to social movement leaders on the ground in Indonesia and the 
Philippines would also be necessary to actually get a sense of how US firms may have 
engaged them before, during, and after the political movements. In the Philippines, for 
example, there is evidence that business interests had a stake in the elections and were 
active in pushing for Aquino, but to make this case strongly would require direct 
evidence from leaders in the Philippines. It may be that evidence is corrupted post-
transition, as certain groups could jockey to take credit for what has come to be viewed as 
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positive changes in a country. But these types of case-studies are beyond the purview of 
my project.  
 The role of US capital in countries that experience political transitions is heavily 
under-researched. This is an important question as the political conditionality of 
investment grew significantly under Clinton, but the effects of US-capital investments 
before, during, and after this period are debatable. This paper aims to make an initial 
foray into research in this vein and finds a positive relationship between US-FDI and 
democratic elections. Case studies of Indonesia and the Philippines show that this 
relationship is nuanced, varying by macroeconomic characteristics and levels of political 
stability. Destabilizing events lead to US-capital pushing for political decentralization 
and free and fair elections. Prior to such events, US-capital intentionally bolsters 
autocrats in the short-term, but it constrains their policy choices in the long-term. As 
discussed above, these results are highly qualified and should be viewed as advancing the 
discussion on the political effects of US-capital investment rather than conclusive 
evidence for the particular effects found here.  
 Future works in democratization should take the methodological and conceptual 
queues in this thesis as pivot points. In particular, scholars may wish to put more 
theoretical leg-work into the measurement of democracy and more rigor into justifying 
the importance of democracy versus other, more-specific political or economic 
institutions and practices. Accurate scholarly work must, especially, drop a priori 
assumptions of the importance of democracy to all things social and political. Such 
conceptualizations suffer from the same methodological biases of dependency theorists, 
albeit in regards to a different set of variables. Furthermore, it is well past time for 
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scholars to move past studying democratization at solely the micro or macro levels. 
Complex interactions between yearly variables on a country-level cannot possibly 
account for context-specific and quickly moving political actions. Likewise, studies that 
focus only on ground level interactions overlook justifiably general, internationally-based 
effects and processes the direct effects of which may stop at the autocrat’s door. The 
question is not whether international factors have a political effect or whether 
modernization theory holds true. These questions are far too simple. Instead we must 
study how the international, the domestic, and the personal interact under varying 
circumstances to yield particular political outcomes using all relevant and available social 
science methodologies. 
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